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Abstract  
Understanding pro-social behaviour in the context of consumer behaviour is of 
theoretical and increasingly, managerial interest. While much research to date has focused on 
one-off consumer decisions, recent research is beginning to explore potential mediators of 
consistency or moral licensing behaviour in sequential consumer choices. Building on previous 
research in both psychology and economics, I examine how the costliness of initial prosocial 
behaviour can influence subsequent prosocial behaviour.  I contribute to current knowledge of 
the effect of costliness on prosocial behaviour by showing that a prosocial behaviour (e.g., 
donation) that is perceived as costly (vs. not costly) increases a subsequent prosocial behaviour. I 
hypothesise that positive affect is an additional mediating mechanism. In a series of four 
experimental studies (and two additional studies in the appendix), this thesis replicates and 
extend prior research and demonstrates that this ‘moral consistency’ effect is mediated by moral 
identity and positive affect.  
 
 
 
Keywords:  Consistency, pro-social behaviour, consumer choice, affect, costliness. 
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Introduction 
 ‘If you do one good deed your reward usually 
 is to be set to do another and harder and better one.’ 
 – C.S. Lewis, The horse and his boy1 
Imagine at your workplace today at lunchtime there is a fundraising presentation from the 
local children’s hospital.  In one scenario, after listening to the presentation, you donate out of 
your own pocket to the hospital. It is an amount that means a lot to you.  In another scenario, 
after listening to the presentation, you give money from your work’s charity fund or out of your 
own pocket, but it isn’t an amount that means a lot to you. Perhaps one scenario might make you 
see yourself as more moral or feel more positive towards the donation than the other. Imagine 
again that before you go home you go online to order a home-delivered meal, so you don’t have 
to cook after a long day.  The restaurant is offering a discount of 25% off the home delivery 
price, giving you the opportunity to donate some or all of that 25% to a local charity. Which 
original donation scenario might influence your choice to make more or less of a donation when 
ordering your home-delivered meal, thereby being consistently altruistic between one moral 
action and another? Would the level to which you felt positive about the workplace donation 
make a difference to whether you would take a higher discount or give a higher donation with the 
restaurant offer?  
This thesis argues that moral consistency is more likely to occur after a meaningful costly 
moral action. Importantly, I argue and demonstrate that a costly (vs. not costly) moral action 
leads to an activation of moral identity and an increased positive affect, which in turns increase a 
subsequent pro-social behaviour. 
 
                                               
1 (Lewis, 1998) 
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Research into the relationship between moral behaviour and subsequent consistency has a 
long history (Harsanyi, 1977; Piaget, 1932; Piaget & Gabain, 1932; A. Smith, 1767). Studies 
have shown that a person who demonstrates moral traits such as altruism, compassion and 
fairness (Aquino & Reed II, 2002; Blasi, 1980, 1984) tends to do so consistently as they consider 
this behaviour a normal part of their moral self-perception (Hart, Atkins, & Ford, 1998). Moral 
identity is the self-inferred view an individual has about themselves which reflects their own 
values as evidenced by their past choices (Bénabou & Tirole, 2011). Moral consistency is 
defined as a process whereby doing something good encourages an individual to subsequently do 
something else good to be consistent (Hart et al., 1998). 
However, consistency may not always be the natural next step after an initial moral 
action. Moral licensing theory (Eisenberg, 2010; Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010; Sachdeva, 
Iliev, & Medin, 2009) suggests there should be a great deal of variability between one moral 
action and subsequent behaviour. That is to say, a person who has done something moral recently 
is more likely to engage in compensatory behaviour (Hamiln & Wilson, 2004; Strahilevitz, 1999; 
Strahilevitz & Myers, 1998). Moral licensing theory functions as part of a broader moral self-
regulation framework where one moral act gives an individual license to behave in a morally 
questionable way as they balance out their actions (Sachdeva et al., 2009). Moral licensing is 
defined as a process whereby doing something good licenses an individual to subsequently do 
something bad because there are moral credits to be spent (Eisenberg, 2010; Merritt et al., 2010; 
Sachdeva et al., 2009). For example, an individual might not volunteer or donate blood if they 
have accrued a ‘surplus of moral currency’ (Sachdeva et al., 2009) from a previous act of 
kindness or from making a prior donation.  
Past research has largely focused on the role of moral identity to explain the relationship 
between an initial and subsequent altruistic action (Aquino, Freeman, Reed II, Lim, & Felps, 
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2009; Shao, Aquino, & Freeman, 2008). The process of evaluating our moral identity is a 
cognitive one in that decision-making is a process of reasoning with individuals assessing and 
weighing up options in a careful and considered manner (Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993) . 
However, few would argue that emotion does not also play a role in moral decision-making 
(Maiese, 2014; Pham, 2007). Affective decision-making is a process of using subjective affective 
reactions towards a target or basing one’s decisions on a momentary feeling (Bless et al., 1996; 
Pham, 1998). Affective decision-making is often faster, more automatic and less sensitive than 
cognitive decision-making to numerical representations as points of reference (Hsee & 
Rottenstreich, 2004; Pham, 1998; Zajonc & Markus, 1982). 
Decision-making’s bimodal nature is variously described as emotional versus rational 
(Pham, 2007), heart versus mind (Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999) or cognitive versus affective 
mindsets (Chang & Tuan Pham, 2013; Luca, Krishna, & Schwarz, 2015). Further, Chang and 
Tuan Pham (2013) found that cognitive and affective mindsets shift across situations, individuals 
and over time. An affective mindset may be activated by inspecting one’s feelings towards a 
situation (Pacini & Epstein, 1999), experience (Strack & Deutsch, 2004) or future choice 
(Novemsky, Dhar, Schwarz, & Simonson, 2007; Pham, 1998; Schwarz & Clore, 2003), and is 
likely to influence subsequent altruistic behaviour. 
Gneezy et al. (2012) and Sachdeva et al. (2009) argue that engaging in a costly 
altruistic act may serve as a stronger signal to an individual's moral self-image/identity than a 
costless altruistic act. This costly act may cause updating of one's moral identity. The authors 
explain why this may occur using the following example.  An individual with a medium level of 
pro-social identity may see themselves as a moral 5 on a 10-point moral identity scale.  If the 
individual behaved morally like a 7 on that scale, moral licensing theory would predict that they 
would subsequently be likely to license themselves to act less morally, perhaps as a 3 to balance 
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out overall as a 5. However, Gneezy et al. (2012) propose a contrasting explanation when 
financial cost is a factor.  In their view, after a costly altruistic action, when an individual 
behaves like a 7, they may update their view of themselves and now see themselves more as a 
moral 6, leading to ongoing higher levels of moral behaviour.  
Gneezy et al. (2012) suggest that conversely, a costless altruistic act serves as 
a weaker signal of one's moral self-image. An individual may morally act like a 7 but in the 
absence of a cost to that action, there is no shift in moral identity.  As a result, and with a focus 
on maintaining their moral identity equilibrium which has not changed, they may now feel 
licensed to act less morally subsequently – i.e. to behave as a 3 at the next opportunity. This 
would allow them to remain as a moral 5 overall. This perspective assumes that the consumer is 
focused on being a good person with their focus on their moral self.   
Perhaps, however, instead of focusing on their moral identity, a person may focus on how 
they feel about the costliness of the initial donation (i.e. their focus is on their feeling state). For 
example, thinking back to the workplace donation scenario, if you felt particularly positive about 
giving a donation which means a lot to you (i.e. is costly), you might be motivated to maintain 
this positive affect and make a higher donation subsequently. However, if the donation amount 
doesn’t mean a lot (is not costly), perhaps the level of positive feelings you experience may be 
less, and not trigger any positive affect regulation mechanism enough to motivate you to donate 
more.  This perspective assumes that the consumer is focused on being happy (their focus is on 
their feelings). As such, positive affect may provide an alternative explanation to the mediating 
effects found by Gneezy et al. (2012) and Sachdeva et al. (2009).  
Recent research has considered these constructs independently from one another and 
largely research focused on demonstrating that each phenomena exists. This research examines 
how moral identity and positive affect operate to mediate the effect of moral costliness on 
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subsequent pro-social behaviour. Based on both empirical and theoretical findings, I demonstrate 
that consistent pro-social behaviour is influenced by the level of perceived costliness of the 
initial action.  Further, I find that moral identity and positive affect mediate the effect of 
costliness on consistent subsequent behaviour. In addition, I show that individuals who are 
focused on how positive they feel about whatever financial donation they have initially made 
give more generously in subsequent donation opportunities. Finally, I find that licensing effects 
are fragile and difficult to replicate when costliness is a factor, identifying a limitation to the 
generalisability of past research in this area. 
My findings are important as they not only contribute to our knowledge of moral 
consistency and moral costliness but also draw attention to the fact that more research is needed 
particularly on the generalisability of moral licensing. 
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Present research 
The body of this thesis is organised as follows. The literature review first considers the 
nature of our moral identity and in particular the literature which focuses on the relationship 
between moral identity and subsequent consistent or licensing behaviour. Second, to better 
understand what activates moral identity and leads to consistency versus licensing in subsequent 
behaviour, I review the literature on the definition and currently understood role of moral 
costliness and in particular, the psychological cost of giving.  I then turn my attention to positive 
affect as an alternative explanation to the consistency versus licensing effects found in previous 
research. Taking all this into account, I examine the gap in the current literature and measure the 
level to which moral identity and positive affect mediate the effect of perceived moral costliness 
on subsequent behaviour in four experiments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Y: Pro-social behaviour X: Costliness  
M: Moral identity (Gneezy et al., 
2012) M: Positive Affect 
Figure 1: Conceptual Model 
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Chapter 1: Theoretical background 
In order to understand the role of moral costliness on subsequent consumer behaviour and 
the mediating effects of moral identity and affect, we first need to establish what moral identity is 
and what we know about its relationship to subsequent charitable behaviour. 
Moral identity and moral consistency 
Theory development in social psychology around the construct of moral identity and its 
relationship with consistency is long and deep (Blanken, van de Ven, & Zeelenberg, 2015). One 
of the earliest modern references to the natural sociability of morality and the desire of an 
individual to use consumption as a means to explain a theory of morality was the work of A. 
Smith (1767).  His view was that society is a mirror through which we judge ourselves, since the 
reactions of others enable us to see ourselves more clearly (C. Smith, 2013). While C. Smith 
(2013) argues that A. Smith (1767) was most interested in people’s drive to show their wealth 
through the purchase of items which reflected that wealth to others, A. Smith (1767) established 
a view that the reason individuals do this is to be externally consistent with the way they 
perceive themselves on many levels, including moral levels.  
Festinger (1962) found that that if a person holds two psychologically inconsistent 
cognitions simultaneously, they experience dissonance.  Dissonance is described as a negative 
drive state that is unpleasant to the point where the individual will either change their attitude or 
their behaviour to make the cognitions more consonant with one another. Resolving such 
dissonance is not, however, limited to adjusting a negative cognition to be consonant with a 
positive one.  It may also be resolved by adjusting any positive cognition to be in line with a 
negative one. I may adjust any positive cognition I hold so it is in line with a negative one I also 
hold, particularly if that negative cognition allows me to maintain a stable, albeit negative, self-
concept. Aronson (1997) sees cognitive dissonance theory as about more than simple 
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consistency: it encompasses how people try to make sense out of situations they find themselves 
in as they pursue reasonable, sensible and meaningful lives.  Aronson (1997) finds the strongest 
and clearest predictions of the effect of cognitive dissonance are when the self-concept of the 
individual is engaged. Aronson (1997) notes Festinger (1962) focus was particularly on the 
important role of an individual’s self-concept in this phenomenon, and led him to suggest that 
most individuals strive for three things:  
• to preserve a constant, stable, predictable sense of self 
• to preserve a competent sense of self  
• to preserve a morally good sense of self. (Aronson, 1997) 
Dissonance, he suggested, is strongest when our behaviour is inconsistent with our self-
concept. He provides an example.  If I see myself as a decent and clever human being and find 
that I have lied to another person in the absence of adequate justification, I feel both guilty and 
stupid.  I am likely then to convince myself as quickly as possible that the lie is true (Aronson, 
1997). Aronson (1997) further explored how an individual’s self-concept might be used to 
insulate them from performing an immoral act such as cheating or lying. He observed that self-
concept affirmations, such as referring to the individual as a kind and generous person, tended to 
induce that individual to resist the temptation to cheat to a greater extent than was the case for 
those in his control group.  This is consistent with the findings of Cohen, Aronson, and Steele 
(2000) on self-affirmation and its role in helping an individual maintain their original attitude 
when given an opportunity to be selfish and avoid performing actions generating future 
dissonance.  
Bem (1967) proposes an alternative interpretation of the phenomena described in 
Festinger’s cognitive dissonance theory. While Bem (1967) doesn’t disagree with the construct at 
some levels, he sees the behaviour of individuals more as a function of our efforts to behave 
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consistently with our self-perception in concert with others in our community. The author defines 
self-perception as an individual’s ability to respond differentially to his own behaviour and its 
controlling variables, and as a product of social interaction (Bem, 1967). Bem (1967) suggests 
that ‘knowing oneself’ isn’t achievable without influence from those within our community.  Our 
cognitive understanding of ourselves reflects how each individual views themselves relative to 
what the author calls the ‘training community’. Understanding the subtle distinctions between 
emotions, for example, Bem (1967) would suggest, may be difficult and misattribution can 
occur, without external cues which are available to an outside observer. Consistent behaviour can 
be understood through a behavioural approach based on self-perception in the light of 
community influences and subsequent actions. In our context, the consumer environment is one 
such training community. 
The cognitive nature of moral identity were articulated by Piaget and Gabain (1932) and 
Kohlberg (1984) in their work on moral reasoning and the stages of moral development. Further, 
Blasi (1980, 1984, 1991) distinguished between moral action as the result of action tendencies 
and their interplay and the mediation effect of cognitive processes. Cognitive processes are 
identified as moral definitions, moral beliefs and moral reasoning.  Moral reasoning is defined as 
‘an expression of the human need for a coherent account of what we are doing.’ (Blasi, 1980, 
p.3).  This coherent account is often based on a verbal moral expression or self-reflection which 
is specifically cognitive.   
Blasi (1980), in his attempt to conceptualise the relationship between cognition and 
action, articulates two forms of consistency.  His first form of consistency is between moral traits 
and moral action (such as being honest and then refraining from stealing).  In the second, the 
consistency of moral behaviour is based on single events and their temporal relation: it is 
demonstrated by functional relationships between actions rather than between a personality trait 
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and an action.  The present study is interested in his first form of consistency (moral trait to 
moral action), which has been developed further by Aquino and Reed II (2002).  
Aquino and Reed II (2002) suggest that self-conceptions can be organised around moral 
traits or characteristics in the same way Blasi (1980) identifies, however they take this idea 
further.  Aquino and Reed II (2002) propose that moral identity is another potential social 
identity which is part of an individual’s social self-schema and is measurable.  The authors 
demonstrated that it was not necessary to understand everything about an individual’s moral 
traits for it to be possible to identify a number of key traits which can be made salient, as a result 
of which moral conduct and behaviour are predictable. Words describing the moral traits which 
may reliably activate a person’s moral identity, according to Aquino and Reed II (2002), are 
compassion, fairness, friendliness, generosity, hard work, helpfulness, caring, honesty and 
kindness.  While it is acknowledged that these are not the only traits of a moral person, these 
traits when considered invoke associations with other traits that are also aligned with an 
individual’s moral self-concept (Aquino & Reed II, 2002).  Moral identity theory presupposes 
that a good deed done activates our view of our moral selves. Once made salient, this view of 
ourselves leads to consistent subsequent behaviour (Aquino & Reed II, 2002).  
Bénabou and Tirole (2011) propose what they call a ‘third-generation theory of moral 
behaviour’ emphasizing the cognitive self-inference process though which we act out evidence 
of our deep values. The authors suggest actions which support one’s moral identity are 
considered identity investments.  When we make moral choices based on our desire to uphold 
values or beliefs, we perceive these as more valuable, oftentimes priceless or sacred. Acting out 
of loyalty to a cause, out of love for another person or even religious faith carries with it a sense 
of morality.  This is internally construed as evidence of our moral identity (Bénabou & Tirole, 
2011). Bénabou and Tirole (2011) demonstrate that voluntarily behaving pro-socially or selfishly, 
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being induced do so or simply reflecting on one’s morality significantly affects subsequent 
behaviour.  The authors note that actions stemming from a reaction to these manipulations can be 
an amplification of the original act (i.e. one generous act leads to another) or can at times be in 
the opposite direction (i.e. one generous act is followed by a selfish one). Bénabou and Tirole 
(2011) point to the power of initial actions as identity investments and note the effective role of 
financial sacrifices in being strong signals of one’s identity. 
In a consumer environment, consumers who purchase products which have attributes 
beyond utility and through the process of their production are pro-social are perceived to be more 
moral than those who don’t (Mazar & Zhong, 2010). That is to say, someone who purchases free-
range eggs (eggs laid by chickens which are able to go in and out of a laying facility at will) is 
perceived to be more moral than someone who purchases caged chicken eggs (eggs laid by 
chickens which are constrained to a cage with many others). For this research, I will use the term 
moral behaviour to mean behaviour which is performed to benefit others including animals 
(Jones, 1991) and immoral behaviour principally to denote behaviour which is self-serving and 
not in the interest of others (Susewind & Hoelzl, 2014). In the work of Gneezy et al. (2012) on 
which I am building, the kind of moral behaviour measured is the choice to lie or tell the truth 
after donating money to charity.  
Moral licensing 
Gneezy et al. (2012) suggest that research on consistency as discussed above conflicts 
with other research that suggests that prior moral behaviour can lead to subsequent immoral 
behaviour in a process that is defined as licensing. The term moral licensing can be defined as 
‘past good deeds liberating individuals to engage in behaviours that are immoral, unethical, or 
otherwise problematic – behaviours that they would otherwise avoid for fear of feeling or 
appearing immoral’ (Merritt, Effron and Monin, 2010, p. 344). Moral licensing theory posits that 
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by undertaking a morally positive action, one is licensed to behave subsequently in a morally 
dubious manner even if the subsequent action on its own may be perceived as immoral, self-
interested or self-indulgent (Kouchaki and Jami (2016). For example, Strahilevitz and Myers 
(1998) found that consumers who purchased a cause-related product tended to donate less 
subsequently to the charity of the product purchased. Khan and Dhar (2006) found that 
consumers who expressed altruistic intent were more likely to purchase luxury goods and to 
donate less than those in the control group (Khan & Dhar, 2006).  While for their study Gneezy 
et al. (2012) manipulated the costliness of the altruistic action, research on licensing behaviour 
has largely focused on financially costless or hypothetical altruistic manipulations.  These 
include recollecting good behaviour or traits (Conway & Peetz, 2012; Cornelissen, Bashshur, 
Rode, & Le Menestrel, 2013; Jordan, Mullen, & Murnighan, 2011; Sachdeva et al., 2009; 
Zeelenberg, Meijers, Blanken, & Ven, 2014), imagining doing something good in the future 
(Khan & Dhar, 2006; Merritt et al., 2010), imagining a ‘good’ purchase (Mazar & Zhong, 2010) 
and engaging in a token supportive action such as wearing a free poppy to support veterans on 
Remembrance Day (Kristofferson, White, & Peloza, 2014).  
Psychology literature 
In psychological research, three theories currently attempt to explain why moral licensing 
effects occur. One sees such licensing effects as a system of moral credits, the second as moral 
credentials, and the third as a process of compensation or cleansing (Mullen & Monin, 2016). 
Moral credits   In this model, an initial behaviour is perceived as part of an 
individual’s moral track record (Merritt et al. (2010). Prior moral behaviour establishes moral 
credits which are then available to balance subsequent less-moral behaviour. Merritt et al. (2010) 
use the metaphor of a bank account: once good deeds are banked, withdrawals are then available 
in the form of bad deeds that are somewhat in proportion to the initial good behaviour. Moral 
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credits require cognitive accessibility to the good deeds at the moment an individual has an 
option to act in a self-interested fashion (Gneezy et al., 2012; Robitaille, 2014).  Conway and 
Peetz (2012) found that those who recalled previous good behaviour were less likely to commit 
to subsequent pro-social activities.  
A number of authors have particularly focused on the licensing effect of the expression of 
ambiguous racial attitudes. Cascio and Plant (2015) found that participants who had committed 
to attending a fund-raiser later in the semester were more likely to demonstrate bias against a 
black candidate in a subsequent hiring task.   
Choi, Crandall, and La (2014) investigated the effect of moral credits on whether and 
when people express their racial prejudice in evaluating advertisements. They found that when 
people had the opportunity to respond positively to an advertisement featuring a black person, 
they subsequently demonstrated racial discrimination.  Choi et al. (2014) attribute this behaviour 
to the accumulation of moral credits and their use in a later situation. 
Effron, Cameron, and Monin (2009) tested how licensing might occur after participants 
endorsed Barack Obama, finding those who had done so were more likely to engage 
subsequently in behaviour which favoured whites over blacks.  The effect was not found after a 
participant endorsed a white candidate or after seeing a photo of Obama, only after endorsing 
him.  These studies suggest that when a prior positive racial attitude is made salient by pointing 
out to participants that their prior behaviour was virtuous, those participants acted less racially 
sensitively, expressed racial preferences about employment or allocated money to a charity in 
ways which favoured whites over blacks.  
Meijers (2014) offers another example of how the moral credits model functions to justify 
less moral or less environmentally friendly behaviour.  After spending significant time separating 
and sorting recycling, an individual takes the car to the shops instead of walking.  The 
ONE GOOD DEED DESERVES ANOTHER 23 
 
justification for this behaviour is that the individual has been environmentally friendly enough 
for one day. The individual’s partner hears about the other’s extensive recycling work and is 
approached to donate to a well-known environmental charity. The partner declines, justifying the 
behaviour on the grounds that the pair have been sufficiently generous as a couple already today 
(Meijers, 2014). 
Moral credentials Unlike the moral credits model that says licensing is a moral 
balancing act, this model posits that a positive or moral initial behaviour changes the meaning of 
subsequent behaviour.  Moral credentials are achieved through past moral actions and even if 
current actions are inconsistent with a past moral standard, the individual relies on the past action 
to vindicate their current behaviour (Merritt et al., 2012; Merritt et al., 2010). For example, if I 
have shown myself not to be racist in the past when firing an employee (such as an African-
American person), if I fire an employee based on race in the future, I do not believe this act is 
racist based on my past moral (non-racist) behaviour.  I’ve proven that I’m not racist in the past 
so I can be confident that a legitimate non-racist explanation will be found for future behaviour 
(Merritt et al., 2010).  Further, individuals may take pre-emptive action strategically to 
demonstrate that they are a moral person to avoid being perceived as immoral in the future. For 
example, a manager might state how supportive of gay marriage he or she may be so that she is 
not perceived as prejudiced when she later dismisses a gay employee (Merritt et al., 2012).  
Compensation or cleansing   This model explains how a negative initial 
behaviour leads to more positive future behaviour as an act of moral compensation or in an 
attempt to cleanse oneself after behaving badly. Mullen and Monin (2016) suggest various 
behavioural constructs are at play during moral balancing which lead to licensing and 
compensatory behaviour.  Compensatory behaviours have been observed in a long-standing 
stream of research on self-regulation, including work on bolstering (Sherman & Gorkin, 1980), 
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guilt (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994), self-completion (Brunstein & Gollwitzer, 
1996), and cleansing (Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000).  
For example, Sachdeva et al. (2009) suggest internal moral balancing is responsible for 
the licensing effects they found in their studies. Like Merritt et al. (2010); Monin and Miller 
(2001) and Effron et al. (2009), Sachdeva et al. (2009) focus strongly on the relationship between 
an individual’s regard to their own self-concept and their licensing behaviour.  They hypothesise 
that moral licensing and moral cleansing effects work together as part of an overall moral self-
regulation process. They propose that people desire to maintain a comfortable moral self-image 
and deviate within this particularly when they are given positive moral feedback on something 
they have recently done.  This stimulates licensing behaviour in the next action.  The authors also 
suggest that moral cleansing is a society-wide, pervasive behaviour which has attracted cultural 
and religious structures to support its operationalisation.  Most religions include actions designed 
to rebalance or purify an individual’s moral state, reinforcing the construct of moral cleansing in 
everyday life (Sachdeva et al., 2009).  
Moral licensing has been receiving increased attention from consumer researchers such 
as Krishna (2011), Khan and Dhar (2006), Mazar and Zhong (2010) and Blanken et al. (2015). 
Research in this area recognises that consumers often face sequential choices in which a prior act 
may effect subsequent consumer behaviour (Khan & Dhar, 2006).  Consumer research in the 
field has focused largely on costless licensing manipulations (see Blanken et al. (2015) for a 
review).  Studies include recalling having good traits, recalling past good behaviour (Blanken et 
al., 2015; Khan & Dhar, 2006; Sachdeva et al., 2009), looking at stores with higher/lower levels 
of pro-social/environmental products (Mazar & Zhong, 2010), and choosing between cause-
related (CR) products (for example, buying a soft drink with 0.50c going to charity) and donating 
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to charity (Krishna, 2011). The purpose of these manipulations is to activate a cognitive self-
construct by providing a behaviour cue for that self-conception (Khan & Dhar, 2006). 
The dependent variables in consumer licensing research most often include either the 
willingness to purchase or the actual purchase of pro-social luxury or prosocial utility goods 
(Blanken et al., 2015; Gneezy et al., 2012; Krishna, 2011; Strahilevitz & Myers, 1998) or 
donating to charity (Gneezy et al., 2012; Khan & Dhar, 2006; Krishna, 2011) or cheating (Mazar 
& Zhong, 2010). The difference between consumer licensing research and psychology licensing 
research is that the former includes activities which are likely to be part of most people’s normal 
consumer experience. 
A specific example of consumer licensing research is the work of Khan and Dhar (2006). 
The authors found that people’s preference for luxury goods (e.g. designer jeans) is higher if a 
prior decision enhanced or boosted their moral self-concept.  In experiments with students, the 
authors found that a prior choice could reinforce moral credentials as a salient aspect of a 
person’s moral self-construct, and as a result allow them to prefer a luxury good over a necessity. 
Khan and Dhar (2006) interpret this as an individual using their moral credentials to dampen the 
negative self-attributions normally associated with purchasing a luxury good, thereby licensing 
this behaviour. Khan and Dhar (2006) also tested an alternative possibility – that the altruistic act 
induced a positive mood, which led to a preference for luxury goods. The authors found no 
difference in mood between each condition and discounted this as a possible explanation.  
Mazar and Zhong (2010) sought to demonstrate through a multi-phase study that 
although purchasing green products reinforces an individual’s sense of their own social 
responsibility and moral identity, it also ‘establishes moral credentials, ironically licensing 
selfish and morally questionable behaviour.’ The authors found that people who bought organic 
food and environmentally friendly products perceived themselves as cooperative, altruistic and 
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ethical. They also found that while exposure to green products activated moral identity and lead 
to subsequent altruistic conduct, purchasing green products created a moral credit, reinforcing 
green credentials – thereby reducing subsequent altruistic behaviour (Mazar & Zhong, 2010). 
The authors explain their findings by suggesting that while green products may prime at a 
cognitive level an individual’s moral self-concept, they also allow the individual to attribute 
moral credits to themselves which can be redeemed in entirely distant domains.  
Kouchaki and Jami (2016) explore the relationship between corporate societal marketing 
(CSM) and subsequent consumer behaviour.  CSM is defined as messages that make consumers 
aware of social/environmental issues, particularly relating to the product they are purchasing. 
They find that CSM both leads to positive consumer responses to the company, and can also 
increase subsequent self-interested behaviour, akin to moral balancing (licensing) driven by a 
temporary boost in self-concept (Kouchaki & Jami, 2016). When the CSM message is focused 
on the good behaviour of the consumer (versus the good behaviour of the company) there is a 
corresponding increase in self-concept.  This may result in behaviour to avoid feelings of guilt 
that may be experienced as a consequence of subsequent self-interest-oriented choices.  
The Research Question  
But when are people more likely to act consistently rather than engaging in licensing? It 
is an interesting question about which there are few studies on which to draw. Recent research 
has particularly focused on the distinction between moral actions versus moral traits (Blanken et 
al., 2015).  In addition, authors such as Conway and Peetz (2012) have sought to identify 
moderators of moral acts such as moral event abstraction and concrete recollections however 
there is little understanding of the role of moral costliness in this effect.  
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Moral costliness 
What is moral costliness and what are the important distinctions for this research? 
Gneezy et al. (2012) refer to a pro-social action done primarily for another person which 
involves a cost to the agent as a costly moral action. Kristofferson et al. (2014) refer to this as a 
meaningful contribution. 
Consumer examples are products which carry the Fairtrade label.  These include coffee, 
sugar, cotton and chocolate. Products with this label include a premium that is paid directly to 
the small-holder farmer which is passed on to the consumer. I follow Gneezy et al. (2012) and 
Kristofferson et al. (2014) and call meaningful financial pro-social behaviour costly. 
Some pro-social consumer products are not more expensive than their conventional 
equivalent.  Gneezy et al. (2012) define behaviour as costless pro-social behaviour when it 
benefits others, but imposes no cost on the giver.  Activities such as signing a petition, liking an 
online page or joining an online campaign are examples of moral actions which require no real 
cost or effort.  Kristofferson et al. (2014) defines an action of this kind as a token action. In the 
consumer setting, the purchase of a product which results in a donation of a percentage of the 
profit to a charity but does not add this to the price of the good would be a costless or token act 
according to Kristofferson et al. (2014), Krishna (2011) and Gneezy et al. (2012). Often products 
with ethical attributes embedded in the supply chain have their costs absorbed by the brand or 
offset by benefits. For example, the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) certification scheme 
was introduced by WWF in 1999. To achieve the MSC label, the product producer must comply 
with an internationally recognised standard for sustainable fishing. The MSC itself claims this 
‘has resulted in greater productivity in addition to greater environmental performance’(Marine 
Stewardship Council, 2015).   
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Other examples of cause-related marketing may also be no-cost options for consumers.  
For example, Kimberley-Clark’s Viva paper towel uses the WWF logo as part of their ‘Love 
your forests’ campaign. Madura Tea donates 5 per cent of the retail price of each packet of tea to 
the Cancer Council (National Breast Cancer Foundation, 2015).  The National Breast Cancer 
Foundation in Australia has products ranging from Tomato Pink Seedlings to Pink Ribbon Home 
Loans all providing some contribution to the foundation and using its logo (National Breast 
Cancer Foundation, 2015). For the consumer, however, there is no additional cost. Cause-related 
marketing is currently used widely by many brands and is a key corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) strategy (Müller, Mazar, & Fries, 2016). Gneezy et al. (2012) and Krishna (2011) refer to 
this pro-social behaviour as costless. 
The psychological cost of giving 
Understanding how making a pro-social purchase could be perceived by a consumer as 
costly or costless requires knowledge from cross-disciplinary inputs (D. H. Smith, 1975). 
Marketing, psychology and economics have long sought to understand how people think about 
money (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). Research in economics tells us that individuals 
vary greatly in their perceptions and attitudes about money and this impacts on the way they 
spend it (Furnham & Argyle, 1998). Research has also provided solid evidence that money 
attitudes operate independently of income (Yamauchi & Templer, 1982) and, when applied to 
donation behaviour, that there is a psychological cost of giving (Wiepking & Breeze, 2012). 
Consumer research identifies differences in the perception of the value individuals receive from 
money, and the perception of purchasing power is affected by who is perceived to own it 
(Polman, Effron, & Thomas, 2018). Polman et al. (2018) found that individuals perceive money 
to have a greater value and power when it belongs to them.  If the same amount of money is 
available but owned by someone else, it is perceived to have less buying power than if it is their 
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own personal funds (Polman et al., 2018). This is relevant to my research in that this suggests the 
price of giving (pro-social costliness) may be experienced differently by different people. While 
Gneezy et al. (2012) use a fixed dollar amount in their research and distinguish between types of 
costliness specifically articulated as costly and costless, the perception of these fixed amounts 
may be subject to a broad range of factors such as those outlined above. While I model my first 
series of experiments on this fixed cost of altruism used by Gneezy et al. (2012), I recognise that 
what is perceived as financially costly to one individual may not seem costly to another. 
With regard to donation behaviour and the perceived value of money, a structured review 
of more than 500 academic articles on charitable giving by Bekkers and Wiepking (2011) 
concludes that the perception of donation cost is subjective and a potential moderator of donor 
behaviour.  Wiepking and Breeze (2012) define perceived costs as the psychological experience 
of cost which is relative to the donor and based on very individual factors affecting this 
perception. The authors draw attention to the plethora of research on philanthropic behaviour 
where cost may be a factor, but suggest the role of the psychological perception of costliness has 
been overlooked (Wiepking & Breeze, 2012). 
In exploring this further, Wiepking and Breeze (2012) seek to demonstrate that 
understanding how money is perceived can help explain charitable donation behaviour. The 
authors find that individuals differ in their perceptions about the dollars they have available to 
spend (or don’t have available to spend) for charitable donations.  They propose that it is these 
differences which influence the price of giving perceived by those making donations, or in our 
context, making pro-social consumer choices (Wiepking & Breeze, 2012). Wiepking and Breeze 
(2012) demonstrate the importance of taking the psychological cost of giving into account when 
considering donation behaviour.  For the present research I ask: do differences in the perception 
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of costliness influence the level to which subsequent behaviour is consistent or subject to 
licensing?  
Economics research on donation behaviour  
Research measuring the effect of various types of financial donations on subsequent 
donations has emerged in public economics literature over recent years. Eckel and Grossman 
(2008), Karlan and List (2007), Rondeau and List (2008) explore donation behaviour when 
donations include matching contributions, donor challenges and rebates. These authors generally 
find that when study participants are asked to match the contributions of a lead donor, their 
subsequent donations to charity are larger than if they give on their own (Eckel & Grossman, 
2008). Eckel and Grossman (2008) conclude their paper by posing a series of questions calling 
for further research into the impact of matched funding, suggesting that there may be a range of 
subsequent donation behaviours which we might, based on the literature in consumer 
psychology, term consistency and licensing.  For example, Eckel and Grossman (2008) draw 
attention to the possibility that when donors are not matched, they may give more over the long 
term, or give less, or lapse as donors altogether (Eckel & Grossman, 2008).  
List and LuckingReiley (2002) and Bracha, Menietti, and Vesterlund (2011) consider 
the effect of seed money on donor behaviour. Studies by both sets of authors find that the more 
seed money made available, the higher the subsequent amounts donated by others when 
compared to the effect of offering refund money. Bracha et al. (2011) however do identify a 
difference in subsequent donation behaviour depending on whether the donations were needed to 
fund a higher-cost versus lower-cost charity service.  Higher-cost charitable services attracted 
higher financial donations, suggesting that there may be a relationship between financial need 
and donation behaviour (Bracha et al., 2011).  Karlan and List (2007) seek to understand the 
economics of charity by measuring the effect of the price of donating through a large field study 
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(50,000 individuals) which used different matched funding amounts 2 in a donation campaign. 
Karlan and List (2007) found that matching grant funding is an effective fundraising method, 
although other factors including events of a political nature or various non-economic factors such 
as the perception of effectiveness of the gift or donation (Karlan & List, 2007) are at play. The 
authors raise the possibility that donors may be motivated by a desire for moral satisfaction and 
suggest further research is required to identify which signals generate the effects they have 
found. 
Research in economics which considers the effect of one donation on another includes 
Potters, Sefton, and Vesterlund (2005), who examine the effect of sequence – one donor  
following another in moves, as Potters et al. (2005) describe them. The authors find that 
sequential donation moves lead to larger contributions to charity than those which are donated 
simultaneously.  They do not however focus on individual sequential voting, nor do they 
consider the psychological reasons which may explain sequential donor behaviour. In the 
authors’ subsequent research on a similar topic, Potters, Sefton, and Vesterlund (2007) make no 
observations as to why this may be the case, nor do they consider the effect of both donations 
being given by the same person where consistency or licensing effects may be found.  
Conversely, de Oliveira, Croson, and Eckel (2011) do explore whether the likelihood that 
one donation will lead to another within groups of donors based on donor type. de Oliveira et al. 
(2011) undertake experimental work to define a type of donor who is consistent in their 
behaviour across multiple donation activities.  Donor types are established against a generosity 
index which measures donation amounts and takes into account the donor’s level of disposable 
income (de Oliveira et al., 2011). 
                                               
2 Matched funding is a method of fundraising whereby a lead donor proposes to match funding provided by 
others to varying ratios.  For example, a donor may offer to donate $10,000 if another donor/s are able to match the 
$10,000.   
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The authors conducted an experiment in which a non-student sample of 190 individuals 
were given an opportunity to make multiple donations to a number of neighbourhood charitable 
organisations. Participants were initially paid a $20 show-up fee and then given an endowment of 
$60 which they could either keep for themselves or give to charity, the options being (1) keep all 
$60, (2) keep $40 and donate $20, (3) keep $20 and donate $40, or (4) donate all $60.  
Participants were randomly provided the opportunity to have their donations matched in what de 
Oliveira et al. (2011) termed a voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM), which I earlier refer to 
as matched funding. The charities were all well-known and respected by participants, and the 
experimenter provided further information including additional details on the purpose of each 
one. The participants were from a low-income area where the $60 (endowment) and $20 ‘turn up 
fee’ equated to nearly 2 days’ wages – large enough to be considered meaningful to participants.  
de Oliveira et al. (2011) found a strong correlation between donation amounts to the local 
charities and the VCM. The researchers interpreted this as demonstrating an underlying desire of 
individuals to give. They also found that those who do give are consistent in their giving 
behaviour, demonstrated by their not only making an initial donation, but going on to donate 
again when a matched funding opportunity was given.  While de Oliveira et al. (2011) were 
principally seeking to propose a model for donor types, the authors posit that key unobservable 
factors are likely to be driving giving behaviour.  Considering other research outlined in this 
section, perhaps the cost of giving money is experienced differently from one individual to 
another and as such may be an important factor in determining how costly a donation is 
perceived.  This may in turn influence the activation of moral identity and subsequent behaviour.  
While these studies provide insight into the role of each factor independently, research 
has failed to consider these factors together. Prior research has not fully investigate the role of 
costliness as a factor in pro-social consistency, the impact that differences in the way costliness is 
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operationalised influence subsequent behaviour to effect moral identity and subsequent 
consistent pro-social behaviour. 
Considering this literature, we hypothesize that:  
H1: A costly (vs. costless) prosocial action increases subsequent prosocial behaviour’. 
H2: A donation perceived as costly (not costly), will activate higher (lower) moral 
identity, which will mediate the effects of costliness on subsequent pro-social behaviour. 
While moral identity has been demonstrated to play a role as identified in other literature 
reviewed and proposed in my first hypothesis, perhaps additional explanations are to be found in 
the role positive affect has in driving subsequent consistent or licensing behaviour and in the 
relevance of the level of personal sacrifice. Therefore, a costly (vs. costless) prosocial behaviour 
increases subsequent prosocial behaviour. 
Blanken et al. (2015) acknowledge, albeit in passing, that doing something good may 
perhaps make people feel happy, and that this could also influence their behaviour. This leaves 
unexplored the question of whether and how positive affect may play a role in motivating 
altruistic behaviour. In the following section I will discuss how the costliness of a moral act 
could result in different types or levels of affective state. These affective responses may activate 
stronger or weaker affect protection mechanisms, impacting subsequent moral behaviour. This 
would provide an alternative explanation to Gneezy et al. (2012). 
Affect as an alternative explanation 
Research suggests that consumer behaviour involves both thoughts and feelings (Gardner, 
1985).  While moral identity is defined as principally a thought process (Aquino & Reed II, 
2002; Reed, Aquino, & Levy, 2007; Shao et al., 2008) people also evaluate their altruistic 
behaviour in terms of their affect and how it makes them feel (Chang & Tuan Pham, 2013; Hong 
& Chang, 2015; Tripathi, 2015). Little is currently known about how affective influences shape 
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moral licensing behaviour as the focus to date has been largely on cognitive constructs (Blanken, 
2015). One as yet unexplored possibility is that the costliness of the behaviour may impact 
consumer feelings, which in turn may influence an individual’s subsequent moral behaviour. For 
example, compared with engaging in a costly altruistic action, engaging in a costless act could 
lead an individual to feel less happy because they may not feel they have made a real sacrifice. 
These feelings in turn could lead the consumer subsequently to act morally in order to feel better 
(i.e. to regulate their mood).  
In this section, I discuss the role of cognitive vs affective focus as an additional 
explanation for the effects of costliness on subsequent moral behaviour found by Gneezy et al. 
(2012). I explore two important questions. One: if the consumer was focused on how they felt – 
on positive affect rather than their thoughts about their moral identity – how might this influence 
their subsequent moral behaviour? Two: how could feelings generated by financially donating 
also potentially influence subsequent moral behaviour? 
Affect has been described as an internal state made up of feelings, emotions and moods 
relating to the emotional interpretation of information, perceptions, knowledge or experiences 
(Huitt, 1996). Affective reactions are faster and more automatic than rational decision-making 
and can occur without much thought (Zajonc & Markus, 1982).  Research over time has 
contended that thoughts about a situation or action produce an affective response particularly 
when relating to preferences which can precede or determine subsequent behavioural responses 
(Lerner & Keltner, 2001).  
Core affect is defined by Russell (2003) as the simple, universal neurophysiological state 
which a person always has – in a similar way to moods but different from them in that its 
expression is in the form of liking or disliking things. When core affect is prolonged without any 
particular object to focus on, it is considered mood. Russell (2003) further defines attributed 
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affect as an emotion as it relates to a specific object, such as being afraid of a bear or liking a 
new tune. Further, the intensity and quality with which one experiences affect can be episodic, 
and the same event can produce widely differing experiences of affect from individual to 
individual. As affect is complex and has varying causes and domains, I will focus on positive 
episodic affect as it relates particularly to pro-social and altruistic behaviour. 
Previous research on affect and moral behaviour has tended to focus on the experience of 
positive affect as a consequence of engaging in a good deed. For example, research on the ‘warm 
glow’ (Andreoni, 1990) effect or the ‘helper’s high’ (Luks, 1988) has consistently found that pro-
social behaviour increases happiness. In fact, donating behaviour triggers neural activities in the 
reward processing area of the brain (Harbaugh, Mayr, & Burghart, 2007). Liu and Aaker (2008) 
found that charitable giving increases the giver’s happiness. 
Being emotionally kind and charitable has been linked with feeling elevated and happy 
but also with well-being, health and longevity (Post, 2005).  Well-being is defined by Post (2005) 
as feeling hopeful, happy, energetic and connected. Post (2005) refers to research by Hunter and 
Lin (1980–1981) which demonstrated that older volunteers score significantly higher on life 
satisfaction indices. For them, positive affect is both an outcome from volunteering and a 
motivation to continue to volunteer (Post, 2005).  
Published research on consumer behaviour has found that spending money on others has 
the same effect on happiness as donating to a cause (Dunn, 2008; Krishna, 2011; Mogilner, 
Aaker, & Kamvar, 2012). Dunn (2008) explored the relationship between spending money on 
oneself (selfish) or on others (pro-social) and the corresponding relationship with happiness.  
They found that people who spent money on others saw their action as a good deed and were 
subsequently happier than those who spent money on themselves. In the study by Dunn (2008), 
participants were asked to rate their happiness and then also to complete a form estimating how 
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much they typically spent in a month on bills and expenses, gifts for themselves, gifts for other 
people and donations to charity.  The results found that pro-social spending was significantly 
associated with increased levels of happiness.  
While positive affect may be the outcome of an altruistic action, the pursuit of positive 
affect may also lead to pro-social behaviour. One theory explaining this which is relevant to my 
research is the theory of affect protection as a goal for moral behaviour (Andrade, 2005). 
Emotional regulation literature shows that when people feel bad, they often look to distracting or 
pleasant experiences to dispel their negative emotions (Andrade, 2005; Kemp & Kopp, 2011). 
This includes making decisions which have a positive effect on affect in order to move away 
from feeling bad, or making choices which regulate their positive emotions to ensure they do not 
shift away from feeling good (Kemp & Kopp, 2011). However there are also circumstances 
when people who feel sad deliberately focus on further sad stimuli such as sad music, gloomy 
paintings and tragic stories (Knoblach & Zillmann, 2002).  Lee, Andrade, and Palmer (2013) 
found that mood-congruence, particularly with aesthetic stimuli, is increased in certain 
circumstances. That is to say that when someone feels bad, they may behave in a way that is 
consistent with this mood. Rotemberg (2014) developed a model of altruism which posits that 
being an altruist is tied to feelings of positive emotion as ‘the extra utility of giving’ (Rotemberg, 
2014, p. 37). The author also suggests donation behaviour can be a response to the desire to 
avoid anticipated guilt if they were to contribute less.  
Andrade (2005) suggests that two theoretical accounts explain the causal influence of 
affect on behaviour.  The static effect assumes that an individual’s feelings at the time influence 
the processing of information, the judgment of that information, and behaviour following.  
According to Andrade (2005), positive affect leads to a more favourable evaluation of the 
environment, and negative affect to a less favourable one, which inhibits action. The second 
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account, dynamic affect, is a regulation-based theory which states that the way an individual 
projects the discrepancy between their feelings at two points in time (i.e., what they feel now and 
what they could feel in the future as a result of the behavioural activity) plays a major affective 
role in guiding behaviour (Andrade, 2005). 
Previous work has dealt with these constructs separately, but perhaps they can be 
considered together.  According to moral identity theory and research by Gneezy et al. (2012), a 
costly moral action activates moral identity strongly, resulting in a reinforced moral sense of self 
and consistent subsequent behaviour.  Altruistic actions also generate positive affect with 
research showing altruistic actions make people happy (Liu & Aaker, 2008). When affect 
regulation is also considered, such an act can be understood as making people likely to choose a 
following action which both is consistent with their moral identity, and also ensures the happy 
feeling generated by being altruistic is maintained with subsequent altruistic acts. 
Costliness of altruism and affect 
How might the costliness of a prior good deed impact a consumer’s feelings? As Gneezy 
et al. (2012) found, a costly moral action activates moral identity strongly, resulting in a stronger 
moral sense of self and consistent behaviour to maintain one’s positive pro-social identity.  
Moreover, Liu and Aaker (2008) also found that a costly altruistic act is likely to result in 
happiness and that different types of altruism may activate happiness as a goal.  Their finding 
makes it reasonable to conclude that, from an affective focus perspective, a consumer may be 
motivated to maintain their good mood by being altruistic again in the future. 
Engaging in a costless good deed, on the other hand, may make the consumer feel less 
positive as they may feel they have made no real sacrifice.  An alternative explanation to that of 
Gneezy et al. (2012) – one which takes this into consideration – may be possible for the costless 
altruistic condition. Perhaps an affective response in the costless condition saw participants 
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experiencing fewer positive emotions than those who were in the costly condition. Individuals 
may not have felt particularly happy, as the costless nature of the initial action may not have 
registered as strongly to their identity or their emotions as a costly action. They may not have felt 
particularly unhappy, as it was clear that something good had happened, but participants may not 
have felt responsible for it.  That is because costless altruism often includes actions which are 
undertaken by a third party such as in a certification scheme, or when a donation is made on the 
individual’s behalf. 
Krishna (2011) found that donation value was a significant predictor of contentment.  The 
author found that purchasing cause marketing (CM) products as a substitute for direct donations 
resulted in lower levels of happiness.  Krishna (2011) also found that those in the costless CM 
condition donated less subsequently than those in the costly donation condition. 
Lilley and Slonim (2014) in their paper titled The price of warm glow measure the 
relationship between financial and volunteering donation behaviour and pure and impure 
altruism.  A pure altruist is defined by Lilley and Slonim (2014) as an individual who identifies 
the value of their donation in terms of its value to the charity itself, while an impure altruist is 
defined as an individual who identifies the value of their donation in terms of the emotional 
experience, the ‘warm glow’ they feel in response to the donation of time or money. Pertinent to 
my research is the fact that Lilley and Slonim (2014) find first, that there is a relationship 
between altruism and positive affect (feelings of warm glow), and that it differs somewhat 
between financially costless donations (i.e. time) and financially costly donation (i.e. cash), and 
second, that impure altruists donate higher amounts of both types of donations when compared to 
their pure altruist colleagues.  Lilley and Slonim (2014) identify differences in donation 
behaviour when tax is introduced, suggesting there are nuances in altruistic behaviour when 
financial amounts change, but they do not explore why this might be the case.  Perhaps the effect 
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of the cost of giving as discussed earlier extends to the level to which one experiences a warm 
glow, influencing the quantum of subsequent donations. 
The impact of charitable giving on an individual giver’s happiness has been demonstrated 
to be quite nuanced (Liu & Aaker, 2008) and not deeply understood in the consumer context. Liu 
and Aaker (2008) found that, when justifying their choices, those in a cause-related marketing 
(CRM) condition made comments which highlighted the value of the utility of the product 
significantly more than those in the non-CRM condition, being a more cognitive than affective 
response.  They also donated significantly less money than the non-CRM group.  The size of the 
donation was a significant predictor of contentment and as the CRM group donated less, they 
were less happy.  In addition, happiness means different things to different people, and this may 
result in a variety of outcomes for individuals.  Mogilner et al. (2012) found that happiness can 
be both feeling excited and feeling calm in different contexts.  This affects individuals’ 
subsequent choices and behaviour (Mogilner et al., 2012). 
Considering the literature as outlined, I hypothesise that: 
H3: A donation perceived as costly (not costly), will increase (not increase) the level of 
positive affect, which will mediate the effects of costliness on subsequent pro-social behaviour. 
These hypotheses are tested in the following four experiments. 
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Chapter 2: Present research 
Experiment 1: Attempted replication and extension of Gneezy et al. (2012) 
Gneezy et al. (2012) hypothesised that moral identity mediates the effect of costliness on 
subsequent licensing or consistency. They argue that a costly moral act serves as a signal to an 
individual’s moral identity because the individual has made a real sacrifice and now needs to 
keep acting morally to maintain this upgraded moral view of themselves, their pro-social 
identity. In contrast, costless pro-social acts do not signal much about a person’s pro-social 
identity and therefore lead to licensing behaviour.   
Gneezy et al. (2012) experiment 1. The first experiment was a laboratory-based single-
factor, 3 level (control vs costly vs costless) between subject design that replicates Gneezy et al. 
Gneezy et al. (2012) manipulated the cost of the altruistic action on the basis that all participants, 
including the control group, received a thank-you payment of $5.  In the costly group, $2 was 
deducted and donated to charity from this, leaving the participant with a total of $3.  In the 
costless group, $2 was donated to charity in addition to money given to the participant, leaving 
the participant with $5.  Nothing was donated from the control group.   
To explain the difference between costly and costless conditions in moral licensing 
behaviour, Gneezy et al. (2012) point to economic models of pro-social behaviour such as the 
work of (Bénabou & Tirole, 2011). As discussed above, Bénabou and Tirole (2011) propose a 
model of identity management where cost matters.  They propose that our belief about our ‘deep 
values’ is a self-inference process cued by ‘identity investments’. These identity investments are 
based on self-signals from previous behaviour where the higher the cost, the stronger the signal 
(Bénabou & Tirole, 2011).  
To measure the effect of costliness on moral identity, Gneezy et al. (2012) used a single-
factor version of the Moral Identity Scale used in Aquino and Reed II (2002). They assessed the 
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level to which their costliness manipulation activated moral self-perception by asking 
participants to complete a two-item, 5-point scale (1: not at all to 5: very much) reporting how 
‘helpful’ and ‘selfish’ they perceive themselves to be.  Gneezy et al. (2012) found that the two 
items were significantly correlated, r (168) = - 0.32, p <0.001. They reverse-coded ‘selfish’ and 
averaged to the two items, creating a composite measure of moral identity.   
The participants then played a two-player modified dictator game whereby one individual 
makes a decision which effectively gives either themselves or another person a financial gain.  In 
the design of Gneezy et al. (2012), by sending an incorrect number in a message to another 
person – i.e. telling a lie – the participant in the study could receive a higher payoff, thereby 
being selfish.   If they told the truth and sent the correct number, they could receive a lower 
payoff, thereby being altruistic. 
Gneezy et al. (2012) findings  
Moral identity. Gneezy et al. (2012) found a significant difference in the level of moral 
identity between treatment groups F (2,167) = 8.90, p <0.001.  They found that participants in 
the costly treatment group reported higher levels of moral identity (M = 3.85, SD = 0.86) than 
those in the control treatment (M = 3.27, SD = 0.82), z = 3.60, p <0.001 and those in the costless 
treatment group (M = 3.26, SD = 0.75), z = 3.60, p = <0.001. Participants in the control and 
costless treatments did not differ in reported pro-social identity, z = 0.37, p =0.71. That is to say, 
those who had borne a cost for the altruism and had $2 automatically deducted from their thank-
you payment, self-reported higher levels of moral identity than those who did not suffer any loss 
by being altruistic (the costless condition).  
In terms of truth telling, 71% of those in the costly group, 52% in the control group and 
30% in the costless group told the truth.  Gneezy et al. (2012) found a significant difference in 
the percentage of participants who told the truth as they had predicted, Pearson’s X2(2) = 18.35, p 
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<0.001. Participants in the costly treatment were more likely to tell the truth than in the control 
treatment, z = 2.11, p = 0.04, or the costless treatment, z = 4.25, p = <0.001.  Further, those in the 
costless treatment were less likely to tell the truth than in those in the control treatment, 
z = -2.40, p = 0.02. 
The authors also found a significant relationship between the costliness of the moral 
action and subsequent consistency/licensing behaviour. Mediation analysis was undertaken using 
the methods of Baron and Kenny (1986) and the bootstrapping method of Shrout and Bolger 
(2002). This analysis found that costliness predicted moral identity (β = 0.35, p = <0.001) and 
truth telling (β = 0.42, p = <0.001). The authors reported that the effect of costliness on truth 
telling was reduced (β = 0.36, p = <0.001) when including moral identity, and that moral identity 
was a significant predictor of truth telling (β = 0.17, p = 0.02). The size of the indirect effect was 
0.015, 0.114 which excluded zero, thereby leading the authors to the conclusion that moral 
identity activation mediated subsequent consistency/licensing behaviour.  
Building on the work and design of Gneezy et al. (2012).  
While Gneezy et al. (2012) concluded that a costly altruistic action activated moral 
identity more than a costless altruistic action, another unexplored possibility is that the costliness 
of the behaviour may have shaped the individual’s feelings, which in turn may have influenced 
their subsequent moral behaviour. For example, the costliness of the initial altruistic act could 
influence happiness, as found by Krishna (2011), or change a person’s mood (Dunn, 2008), or 
prime varying levels of thoughts of connectedness, as found by Uleman (2000).  All these studies 
found that altruistic behaviour influenced affect with flow-on effects to subsequent actions.  
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Gneezy et al.’s (2012) second conclusion was that it was this activated level of moral 
identity from the costly nature of the altruistic action that mediated the consistent versus 
licensing effect found in the costless altruistic condition. Given the discussion above about the 
alternative affective mediators, I propose that this conclusion needs further examination.  In my 
first experiment I sought to replicate the work of Gneezy et al. (2012), hypothesising that 
costly/costless altruistic action will lead to subsequent increases/decreases in prosocial behaviour 
(H1),  a costly altruistic action, relative to a costless one, increases levels of moral self-
perception, leading to increased consistency on a subsequent pro-social behavior (H2), and a 
costly altruistic action, relative to a costless one, increases levels of positive affect (as 
demonstrated by happiness, mood and connectedness), leading to increased consistency in 
subsequent pro-social behavior (H3). 
 
 
To mirror Gneezy et al. (2012) as closely as possible, the study was designed using the 
authors published material.  The study design follows Gneezy et al. (2012) in all respects except 
that I included measures of happiness, mood and connectedness in addition to the moral identity 
measure taken directly from Gneezy et al. (2012). Further instructions published by Gneezy et 
al., (2012) were revised slightly using simpler terminology for greater comprehension by the 
Y: Prosocial (truth/lie) X: Costliness (costly/costless) 
M: Moral identity (Gneezy et al., 2012) 
M: Affect (happiness, mood, connectedness) 
Figure 2: Mediation model adapted from Gneezy et al., 2012 including  
potential affect mediators of happiness, mood and connectedness. 
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multi-national student cohort in Experiment 1 with very few changes.  I conducted power 
analyses using GPower (Faul & Erdfelder, 1992; for a full description, see Erdfelder, Faul, & 
Bucher, 1996) with power (1 - β) set at 0.80 and α = .05, one-tailed on the smallest effect size 
found by Gneezy et al. (2012) which was between moral identity and subsequent donation 
behavior (B = .17, p = .002, R2 = .029). This showed that sample sizes should be N = 209 to have 
enough power to detect an effect of costliness on positive affect and subsequent pro-social 
behaviour, and a main effect of costliness on subsequent pro-social behaviour, based on these 
parameters. 
Method 
Participants and recruitment 
Two hundred and twelve undergraduate marketing students (88 males and 124 females) 
were recruited through the Marketing Discipline Subject Pool. The sample was principally young 
adults 20–24 years of age (70.8%) with 18.9% 15–19 years of age and 10.5% 25–34 years of 
age. 22 language groups and 32 nationalities were represented. Participants received 2 credit 
marks towards their overall course mark and a $5 thank-you payment for their participation. 
Participants were told that they could withdraw at any time, in line with common ethical 
practices.  
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Measures 
Moral identity measure. Following Gneezy et al. (2012) the same moral identity measure 
tool was used (Aquino et al., 2009; Aquino & Reed II, 2002; Gneezy et al., 2012; Reed et al., 
2007). As outlined earlier, this required participants to complete a two-item, 5-point measure (1: 
not at all to 5: very much) assessing the extent to which they saw themselves as ‘selfish’ and 
‘helpful’.  The items were reverse coded and averaged to form a composite measure of moral 
identity as in Gneezy et al. (2012).  
Affect measures 
Happiness. When measuring happiness I adapted the work of Lyubomirsky and Lepper 
(1999) which was also used by Dunn (2008), using a simple subjective measure of happiness 
which included asking participants to rate their response to the question: ‘Do you feel happy 
right now?’ Participants could respond on a 5-point scale (1 = no, 5 = yes) as in Dunn (2008). 
Mood. Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988) was used to measure the effect of the treatment on mood. This well-known scale consists 
of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Participants were instructed to read each 
item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word.  ‘Indicate to what 
extent you feel this way now from very slightly or not at all (1) to extremely (5).’ 
Connectedness. When measuring connectedness, I built on the work of Uleman, Rhee, 
Bardoliwalla, Semin, and Toyama (2000), asking participants to rate the level of connectedness 
they feel in their community.  They were shown the series of circles below and asked to select 
which pair represented how connected they felt. 
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Design and procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions (IV): costly altruism 
(n=69), costless altruism (n=73) and control (n=70). Following Gneezy et al. (2012), I 
manipulated the cost of the altruistic action on the basis that all participants, including the control 
group, received a thank-you payment of $5.  As in Gneezy et al. (2012), the costly group was 
told they were given $5, however $2 was deducted and donated to charity from this, leaving the 
participant with a total of $3.  In the costless group, participants were given $5 and told that $2 
was donated to charity in addition to money given to the participant, leaving the participant with 
$5.  Nothing was donated from the control group, leaving the participant with $5. 
Participants were then directed to complete the moral identity and affect measures as 
described above in the order happiness, mood, moral identity and connectedness.  Following 
these measures, as in Gneezy et al. (2012), participants played the two-player modified dictator 
game.  Participants could make a choice to be selfish and lie, thereby potentially receiving a 
higher payoff, or they could choose to be altruistic and tell the truth and potentially receive a 
lower payoff.  This functioned as the dependent variable of altruism/selfishness. 
Unlike Gneezy et al. (2012), I subsequently repeated the measures of happiness, moral 
identity and connectedness and asked a range of filler consumer questions, some demographic 
questions and open-ended questions.  I did not repeat the PANAS, but asked participants to rate 
how they characterised their mood on a scale of 1 to 10 (1 being negative and 10 being positive). 
I was interested also to establish if there were any subsequent effects of the decision to be 
altruistic or selfish on our initial measures. 
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Data analysis 
In general, I was interested in comparisons between the three groups (control, costless 
and costly) on the various measures. As the purpose was to replicate the findings of Gneezy et al. 
(2012), I followed the same analyses. One-way ANOVA was used for multi-group comparisons, 
with Mann-Whitney U-tests used for pairwise comparisons between the groups for continuous 
measures. Where the measure was ordinal or nominal (e.g. frequency data, such as the 
percentage of people telling the truth), chi-square tests of independence were used, with pairwise 
tests of proportions to compare the groups. No data were missing. Unless stated otherwise, an 
alpha of .05 was used throughout. 
Results 
Analysis of potential mediators 
Moral identity measure 
In terms of moral identity, the costless group reported the highest mean in moral identity 
(M = 3.79, SD = 0.70) followed by the control group (M = 3.70, SD = 0.70) then the costly group 
(M = 3.62, SD = 0.69), these means are not significantly different F (2,209) = 1.25, p = .289.  A 
more focused pairwise comparison also found no significant differences between the costless 
group and the control group (z = -.87, p = .387), or the costless and costly group (z = -.40, p 
= .690) or the control and costly group (z = -.87, p = .387). That is to say, the levels of self-
perceived moral identity did not differ among the groups, whether or not they bore a cost for 
altruism. 
Affect measures 
In terms of happiness, the costly group had the highest mean score (M = 2.57, SD = 1.2), 
followed by costless (M = 2.42, SD = 1.01) and then control (M = 2.24, SD = 1.19). Again, these 
means are not significantly different F (2,209) = 1.49, p = .229.  However, more focused 
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pairwise comparisons found a significant difference between the costly and control groups 
(z = -2.02, p = .043). No significant differences were observed between the costly and costless 
treatment groups (z = -.94, p = .349) or costless and control groups (z = -1.50, p = .134).  That is 
to say, those who had borne a cost for the altruism and had $2 automatically deducted from their 
thank-you payment self-reported higher levels of happiness than those who did not suffer any 
loss by being altruistic (the costless condition) or who were not altruistic at all (control group).  
In terms of positive mood (PANAS Positive – higher scores represent higher positive 
mood), the control group had the highest mean of positive mood (M = 29.91, SD = 7.46) 
followed by costless (M = 28.74, SD = 7.80) and then the costly group (M = 27.56, SD = 8.44). 
These means are not significantly different F (2, 211) = 1.534, p =.218.  No significant pairwise 
differences were observed between the control group and costless group (z = -.691, p = .489), the 
control and the costly group (z = -1.66, p = .097) or the costless and the costly group (z = -.825, 
p = .409). In summary, those who had borne a cost for the altruism and had $2 automatically 
deducted from their thank-you payment self-reported no real difference in levels of positive 
mood from those who did not suffer any loss by being altruistic (the costless condition). 
In terms of negative mood (PANAS Negative – lower scores represent less negative 
mood), the costless group had the lowest mean score, feeling least negative (M = 13.71, 
SD = 4.14) followed by the costly group (M = 14.32, SD = 5.60) and then the control group 
(M = 14.63, SD = 4.54). These means are not significantly different F (2, 212) = .682, p = .507. 
No significant pairwise differences were observed between costless and costly groups (z = -.731, 
p = .465), costless and control (z = -1.39, p = .164) or costly and control groups (z = -.759,  
p = .448). This tells us that the levels of negativity did not differ among the groups, whether or 
not they bore a cost for altruism. 
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In an analysis of connectedness, the control group had the highest connectedness mean 
(M = 4.53, SD = 1.00), followed by costless (M = 4.16, SD = 1.19) and then costly (M = 4.00, 
SD = 1.04). A univariate analysis of variance did find a significant omnibus effect F (2, 212) = 
4.34, p = .014. A more focused pairwise comparison found significant difference between the 
control and costly groups (z = -2.89, p = .004). No significant differences were observed between 
the control and costless groups (z = -1.63, p = .100) or the costly and costless groups (z = -1.10, 
p = .270). This finding shows that those who had not been altruistic reported higher levels of 
connectedness than those who had been altruistic and incurred a cost (costly). 
My findings suggest that the manipulation was not effective in activating moral identity 
or affective factors as designed. 
DV – Truth telling  
Overall findings showed no significant difference in the percentage of participants who 
told the truth, X2 (2) = 0.23, p = 0.891. 56.5% of those in the costly treatment group told the truth. 
52.9% in the control group told the truth and 56.5% in the costless group. Participants in the 
costly group were not significantly more likely to tell the truth than those in the control group, 
p > 0.05 and the costless group, p > 0.05.  Further, those in the control group were not more 
likely to tell the truth than those in the costless group, p > 0.05. 
Mediation 
The PROCESS Macro does not support binary mediators or outcome variables. Instead, I 
used MPlus (version 7.4). Using a logit link (i.e., logistic regression models), maximum 
likelihood estimator and bootstrapping with 10,000 draws, I individually moderated potential 
mediation effects between the independent variable, being group (costly, costless and control) 
and the dependent variable, being telling the truth (altruism) vs lying (selfishness) for the 
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following mediators: moral identity, happiness, connectedness, and positive and negative affect. 
None of the results for either direct or indirect paths was statistically significant (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Indirect and direct effects for mediation analyses between group (costly, costless and 
control) and telling the truth (altruism) or lying (selfishness) by mediator 
Mediator Indirect effect Direct effect 
  Estimate SE p 95% CI 
lower 
95% CI 
upper 
Estimate SE p 95% CI 
lower 
95% CI 
upper 
Connectedness .016 .029 .567 -.032 .085 .050 .175 .774 -.288 .394 
 Happiness .001  .017 .949  -.033 .041  .065 .174 .708  -.270 .407 
 Moral 
Identity 
.014  .022 .536  -.022  .068  .053 .177 .764  -.237 .399 
 PANAS Neg  -.020 .028 .485  -.090 .018  .086 .174 .620 -.254 .566 
 PANAS Pos  -.003 .015 .854  -.028 .030  .069 .174 .691 -.268 .410 
 
Additional analysis 
After the game in the experiment, I repeated the measures of mood, moral identity, 
connectedness and happiness.  While these additional measures were not part of the Gneezy et al. 
(2012) study, by conducting a univariate analysis of variance on between subject factors, I found 
that differences in the level of moral identity between those who were altruistic (told the truth) 
and those who were not altruistic (lied) were significant F (2, 212) = 11.97, 
 p = .001.  Participants who told the truth reported significantly higher levels of moral identity (M 
= 3.74, SD = .64) than those in the group who lied (M = 3.4, SD = .81).  
In terms of happiness, pairwise comparison found no significant differences between 
those who were altruistic (told the truth) and those who were selfish (lied) F (2, 210) = .01,  
p = .585.  As far as community connectedness, pairwise comparison also found no significance 
between those who were altruistic (told the truth) and those who were selfish (lied) F (2,210) = 
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2.52, p = .815. There was also no difference in between those who were altruistic versus selfish 
in their mood F (2, 210) = 3.43, p = .373. 
When comparing those who told the truth by gender, 62.5% of men told the truth and 
50% of women told the truth, X2 (1, N = 212) = 3.252, p = .071.  Further, while there is a long 
history of proposed links between being religious and altruism (see the work of James, 1902, 
Durkheim, 1912, etc.) I found no such association between costliness and altruism, X2 (1, N = 
212) = 3.071, p = .380 based on religiosity.  Gneezy et al. (2012) did not report findings for 
gender or religiosity.  
Discussion 
The results from Experiment 1 did not replicate the findings of Gneezy et al. (2012), 
refuting my first hypothesis.  Gneezy et al. (2012) found that the costliness of the initial altruistic 
action activated moral identity to significantly differing levels: their costly group experienced 
significantly higher levels of moral identity than their costless or control groups, while mine did 
not.  On the effect of the initial action on truth-telling, while Gneezy et al. (2012) found the 
costly group to be more likely to be consistent in their subsequent action and again to act 
altruistically by telling the truth, I did not.  Gneezy et al. (2012) also found that the costless 
group were more likely to be selfish and lie, and I did not. However, when the measures were 
repeated after the replication section of the study, the act of being altruistic (telling the truth) 
versus not being altruistic (lying) was found significantly to activate moral identity. Perhaps my 
manipulation of costliness using the Gneezy et al. (2012) method was unsuccessful for 
situational reasons unknown to me. As I had no specifically altruistic secondary dependent 
variable, I was not able to test whether the mediating effect of moral identity on a subsequent 
altruistic action was consistent or licensing. However, this finding does support further enquiry 
into costliness and moral identity. 
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While I had hypothesised a mediating effect of moral identity and my affective measures 
as an alternative explanation, I did not find this.  I did however find that those in the costly group 
were more likely to report higher levels of happiness when compared to the control group, 
suggesting that there is an affect response to the costly altruistic action. I also found that 
costliness has a negative impact on feelings of connectedness: the control group measured 
significantly higher on this scale than the other groups.  Again, this suggests that there is some 
sort of affect effect to costliness which should be explored further. 
Another possible explanation for the non-replication is that the activation of moral 
identity may possibly be muted by the introduction of affective measures. In the measures in 
Experiment 1, two affect measures preceded the moral identity measure.  Perhaps subsequent 
licensing/consistency effects may have been washed away by the mixed mindset created by both 
affect and moral cognition measures. In order to address this possibility, a follow-up experiment 
(Experiment 2) was conducted without the presence of any affective measures.   
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Experiment 2 
In this experiment I hypothesised that by re-running study 1 without affect measures any 
reduction in the costliness signals on moral identity would be avoided, thereby replicating the 
original mediating effects found by Gneezy et al. (2012).  This would support an explanation for 
the failure to replicate the findings of Gneezy et al. (2012) in Experiment 1 – namely, that the 
introduction of a focus on affect wiped away the mediating effects of moral identity on 
costliness.3 My hypothesis therefore was: 
H1 A costly/costless altruistic action will lead to subsequent increases/decreases in 
prosocial behaviour, mediated by moral identity. 
 
 
One hundred and one undergraduate marketing students (36 males and 65 females) were 
recruited through the Marketing Discipline Subject Pool between 20 and 29 April 2015. The 
sample was principally young adults 20–24 years of age (64%) with 17% 15–19 years of age and 
19 % 25–44 years of age. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: control 
(N = 39), costly altruism (N = 32) and costless altruism (N = 30).  
                                               
3 This follow up experiment also included a separate happiness condition to test the possibility that 
happiness may mediate or moderate the effect of costliness on subsequent altruistic/not altruistic behaviour. 
However, the measure of happiness was left off the study, making mediation analysis unavailable to us.  The overall 
results found no significant difference in the percentage of participants who told the truth when comparing those in 
the moral identity group or the happiness group, X2 (1) = 0.09, p = 0.759.  Full results of this study are available in 
Appendix B. The results included in the main paper apply only to the participants who undertook the Gneezy et al. 
(2012) replication aspect of the study. 
Y: Prosocial (truth/lie) X: Costliness (costly/costless) 
M: Moral Identity (Gneezy, Imas, Brown, Nelson, & 
Figure 3: Second attempt at replication of Gneezy et al., 2012. 
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Following Gneezy et al. (2012), I manipulated the cost of the altruistic action on the basis 
that all participants, including the control group received a thank-you payment of $5.  In the 
costly group, $2 was deducted from this and donated to charity, leaving the participant with a 
total of $3.  In the costless group, $2 was donated to charity in addition to money given to the 
participant leaving the participant with $5.  Nothing was donated from the control group.   
As in the previous study and in Gneezy et al. (2012), each participant was then given the 
option to tell the truth or lie in the form of a modified dictator game.  If they lied, they had a 
chance to earn additional money, a selfish act.  If they told the truth, another person had the 
chance to earn more money, a selfless act. 
Results 
In terms of replication of Gneezy et al. (2012) a univariate analysis of variance did not 
find a significant omnibus effect F (2,101) = 1.74, p =.181. By taking away the focus on affect, I 
did not replicate the mediation effects found by Gneezy et al. (2012).  The costly group reported 
the highest levels of moral identity (M = 3.82, SD = 0.56) followed by control (M = 3.72, SD = 
0.66), then the costless group (M = 3.53, SD = 0.61.  No significant differences were observed 
between costly and control (z = -.24, p = .811), costly and costless (z = -1.86, p = .063), or 
control and costless (z = -1.55, p = .122). This is consistent with the findings of Experiment 1 in 
that the levels of self-perceived moral identity did not differ among the groups, whether or not 
they bore a cost for altruism.  
When analysing the results for the DV or telling the truth (altruism) versus lying 
(selfishness), I did not replicate the findings of Gneezy et al. (2012) in that there was no 
significant difference in the percentage of participants who told the truth, X2 (2) = .168, p = .708. 
In terms of means, the control group reported telling the truth more (38.6%) than the costless 
group (31.7%) and the costly group (29.7%). Again, I did not replicate the licensing versus 
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consistency effects found by Gneezy et al. (2012).  This implies that the presence of affective 
measures in Experiment 1 were not the cause of the lack of replication.   
Additional analysis 
As in Experiment 1, following the Gneezy et al. (2012) replication procedure, I asked 
participants to complete a range of filler tasks. The first was a simple personality questionnaire 
which was followed by a repeat of the moral identity measure.  While these additional measures 
were not part of the Gneezy et al. (2012) study, by conducting a univariate analysis of variance 
between subject factors, I found that differences in the level of moral identity between those who 
were altruistic (told the truth) in a manner which gave another person the opportunity to earn 
more money than they would (costly) and those who were not altruistic (lied) was significant F 
(1, 100) = 2.733, p = .010. That is to say, those who made a costly altruism decision in the game, 
reported significantly higher levels of moral identity (M = 3.71, SD = .58) than those in the group 
who didn’t tell the truth and were selfish (M = 3.37, SD = .70).  
When comparing those who told the truth by gender, by conducting a univariate analysis 
of variance between subject factors, I found no differences in the level of truth telling (altruism) 
versus lying (selfishness), X2 (1, N = 100) = .415, p = .190.  
Discussion 
As in Experiment 1, I did not replicate the findings of Gneezy et al. (2012) and my 
hypothesis was not confirmed.  In this experiment I did not add anything to the method and 
procedure of Gneezy et al. (2012) in the moral identity condition and yet still did not replicate 
either their consistency or licensing effects. Perhaps an explanation for my nil effects may be 
found in the manipulations of costliness.  In Experiment 1 I did find a subsequent effect after 
participants personally chose either to be altruistic and tell the truth, which had a real financial 
cost in the game, or to be selfish and lie, being the dependent variable in Gneezy et al. (2012).  
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This result was replicated in the follow-up experiment. Gneezy et al., (2012) relied on the initial 
donation to be a forced fixed cost and the costless condition to be of no cost or a cost borne by 
someone else.  The authors’ rationale in doing this was to avoid self-selection; however, as 
discussed earlier, research shows that perception of the costliness of money is nuanced, with 
variations in social meaning (Zelizer, 1989). This may explain in part my failure to replicate 
Gneezy et al. (2012) in that a two-dollar donation out of a five-dollar thank-you payment means 
more to some than others.  Perhaps the price of giving in this instance was not sufficient to meet 
an internal perception of being costly, which would be necessary to activate moral identity 
sufficiently to achieve the predicted subsequent results. These results identify a limitation to the 
generalisability of past research in this area. 
Further, subsequent experiments will be designed to examine how the potential mediating 
effect of happiness might provide an alternative explanation for the findings of Gneezy et al. 
(2012) as originally hypothesised. 
Finally, it appears impossible to replicate activating moral identity to be higher/lower 
with subsequent licensing effects. From this point in this thesis, I will pivot my theory and 
experimental work away from the Gneezy et al. (2012) design and those authors’ focus on 
licensing. Experiments 3 and 4 will measure the effect of different articulations of costliness on 
moral identity and happiness as potential mediators of subsequent consistent pro-social 
behaviour.  Experiment 3 is preceded by a pre-test of various manipulations of costliness to avoid 
fixed financial donation amounts and to test the effect of various forms of donation behaviour 
which could be considered costly, not costly or costless.4 Further, the pro-social dependent 
variable will be a consumer choice more closely aligned with actual consumer behaviour.   
  
                                               
4 These categories of costliness are explained in the introduction of this thesis with accompanying 
consumer examples. 
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Chapter 3 – A story of consistency 
My initial experimental work sought to build on previous studies of consistency versus 
licensing effects; however licensing effects appeared elusive and were not found. I did find 
evidence for consistency, however, and therefore, since licensing effects could not be replicated, 
I will turn specifically to the relationship between moral costliness and consistency in subsequent 
behaviour. In the following two experiments (and pre-tests) I hypothesise that the effect of 
costliness on subsequent altruistic behaviour will depend on how the consumer reflects on the 
costliness of the prior altruistic act. A costly act may cause updating of one's moral identity (to 
go from a 5 to a 7) (Gneezy et al., 2012). To maintain this updated increased moral identity, one 
must continue to behave morally. In this way, moral identity mediates the effect of costliness on 
subsequent behaviour, resulting in consistency.  
Consistent with research previously described, a person may also focus on how positive 
they feel towards the donation (i.e. their focus is on their feeling state) and their desire to 
maintain positive affect (i.e. in line with mood protection theories). This is a positive affective 
focus. In this case, a donation which means a lot (i.e. is costly) activates positive affect similarly 
to the way it activates moral identity. If the donation is costly, the person experiences a higher 
level of positive affect and seeks to maintain that higher positive affective state.  If the donation 
amount doesn’t mean a lot (is not costly), they may still experience some positive affect, but they 
will not need to make as large a donation to maintain this more modest positive affect level. In 
this way, positive affect partly mediates the effect of costliness on subsequent behaviour. 
Crowd-sourced data collection (MTurk) 
In moving away from the Gneezy et al. (2012) experimental design, a preliminary 
scenario study was conducted to test the effect of other forms of costliness manipulation on 
moral identity.  These pre-test studies were conducted using crowd-sourced data collection 
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methods, specifically Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). I also included two altruism-dependent 
variables in the pre-test to ascertain their effectiveness in an MTurk environment. Following the 
pilot tests, two experiments were conducted to examine the mediating effect of moral identity 
and positive affect on donation behaviour. 
In their tutorial on crowd-sourcing for data collection in consumer research, Goodman 
and Paolacci (2017) found that 43% of behavioural studies were conducted using Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) between June 2015 and April 2016.  Goodman and Paolacci (2017) 
expressed a number of concerns with this method of online sampling, including 
representativeness, self-selection, participant non-naiveté and attrition bias. However they note 
that much progress has been made in establishing appropriate and valid data collection strategies 
for this method.  Goodman and Paolacci (2017) propose crowd-sourcing consumer research 
guidelines which I have addressed systematically in my study design.  
Pre-test design and procedure 
The effect of costliness on moral identity was pre-tested using a between-subject 
experimental design as set out in Table 2. 
Table 2: Between-subject experimental design including cell sizes 
Independent variables  Dependent variables 
Pair 1 (78) 
Costly (38) 
vs Costless 
(40) 
Pair 2 (79) 
Costly last 
note (42) vs 
many notes 
(37) 
Pair 3 (70) 
Costless first 
donation (35) 
vs last 
donation (35) 
Pair 4 (80) 
Costly 
meaningful 
(40) vs 
meaningless 
(40) 
Pair 5 (79) 
Costless 
meaningful 
(39) vs 
meaningless 
(40) 
Moral identity measure  
Check measure 
Other measures 
Altruism dependent 
variables 
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Five hundred and five adults were recruited through MTurk on 7 December 2017. After 
removing participants who did not correctly answer the attention check question, the sample size 
was 386, (222 males, 161 females and 3 who identified as ‘other’). The sample was principally 
adults 20–34 years of age (57%) with participants fairly evenly spread over the other age groups 
including 65 and over. Twenty-six nationalities were represented, however the majority of 
participants were from India (106) and the United States of America (243) 5. Participants were 
paid $0.35 USD for their participation, so as to receive no less than the US minimum wage of 
$7.92 USD per hour (United States Department of Labor, Retrieved 15 January 2017). The 
average time taken by participants was one minute 59 seconds. This effectively equates to an 
hourly rate of $10.50 USD. 
Once the task as advertised by MTurk (called a HIT) was accepted by a participant, they 
would click on a link to a Qualtrics survey.  To comply with my Ethics Approval 2017/707, the 
first page of the survey included a participant information and consent form.  Continuing with 
the survey indicated consent.  
Participants were then asked to try to imagine they were in the following situation. There 
is a charity display at your workplace where you normally sit for lunch. Spend a moment 
thinking about being in that place and listening to a charity presentation. After listening to the 
presentation…’ 
Participants were then randomly assigned one of the following conditions, paired for 
comparison and analysis. The distinctions between pairs differed in terms of the donation being 
                                               
5 While not explored in full in the main body of the thesis, I found that participants’ country of origin and a 
number of my measures were significantly correlated: country and selfishness r (349) = - .182, p <0.001, country 
and helpfulness r (349) = - .245, p <0.001, country and donation effect on thinking differently about yourself  r 
(349) = - .317, p <0.001, country and perception of costliness r (349) = - .305 p <0.001, country and perceived level 
of sacrifice r (349) = - .292, p <0.001.  In each case, Indian reported higher mean scores in each scale suggesting 
there may be some cultural factors at play worthy of further investigation. All future experiments used only 
American participants to maintain consistency of understanding and interpretation of the study designs. 
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financial and given by the individual (costly) versus being given by the individual, but on behalf 
of their work (costless).  Further distinctions were made to explore the effect of the donation 
being relative to the amount of cash in the wallet of the individual or in the work’s fund.  In the 
final two pairings, I explored the role of relative meaningfulness taking into account the 
learnings from the previous experiment and the literature – in that not all financial amounts mean 
the same. Finally, this being a scenario study run on MTurk, each articulation of a donation had 
to translate effectively into the online environment. 
Table 3: Manipulations of costliness in pre-test 
 A  B 
Pair 1 Costly: You give your own money to 
the charity. (Q3) 
Costless: You give money from your 
work’s charity fund to the charity. (Q4) 
Pair 2 Costly last note: You give the last 
note you have in your wallet to the 
charity. (Q7) 
Costly many notes: You give one of 
many notes in your wallet to the charity. 
(Q8) 
Pair 3 Costless first donation: Your give 
your work's charity fund money to the 
charity. This will be the first donation 
made by the fund. (Q9) 
Costless money last donation: You give 
your work's charity fund money to the 
charity. This will be the last donation made 
by the fund.  (Q10) 
Pair 4 Costly meaningful: You give your 
own money to the charity.  The 
donation means a lot to you. (Q11) 
Costly meaningless:  You give your own 
money to the charity.  The donation does 
not mean much to you. (Q12) 
Pair 5 Costless meaningful: You give your 
work's charity money to the 
Costless meaningless: You give your 
work's charity money to the charity.  The 
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charity.  The donation means a lot to 
you. (Q28) 
donation does not mean much to you. 
(Q29) 
 
Participants were then asked to complete the same moral identity measure tool as 
previously used in this research with the exception that, to maintain consistency with other 
measures in this study, I extended this to be a 7-point scale with the same end points for both 
selfishness and helpfulness. The selfishness item was reverse coded and averaged to form a 
composite measure of moral identity as in Gneezy et al. (2012). 
To better understand how the various manipulations of costliness might be interpreted, I 
then asked participants to complete additional questions including, Did the donation make you 
think differently about yourself? (7 point Likert scale: not at all to a great deal), How important 
is this kind of donation to you? (7 point Likert scale: not at all to very much), How financially 
costly was the donation to you? (7 point Likert scale: not at all to very much) and How much of a 
sacrifice was the donation to you? (7 point Likert scale: not at all to very much).  
Next, participants were presented with two altruism-based choices.  The first asked 
participants to imagine that later in the day they received an email from their telecommunications 
provider. They are having a special offer for this month only.  Participants could choose between 
a $10 discount off their monthly bill or they could give some, or all, of the $10 to charity. They 
were asked to identify how much they would take as a discount versus give to charity. The 
second altruism-dependent variable asked participants to imagine that later in the day they run 
into a friend who is having a tough time.  The friend mentions that they are in a real mess at 
home and it is getting to them. Participants are asked to rate their response on the following 
scales: How likely are you to offer to clean up the friend’s apartment? (7 point Likert scale: 
extremely unlikely to extremely likely) and How much of a factor is how you feel in this decision? 
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(5 point Likert scale: none at all to a great deal). Participants then completed demographic 
questions. 
In terms of moral identity, by conducting a univariate analysis of variance on between-
subject factors, I found the differences in the level of moral identity between treatment groups 
were significant F (9,385) = 4.229, p < .001.  
Table 4: Moral identity self perception results – means and pairwise comparisons 
Pair Condition A Condition B  
Pair 1 Costly (M = 4.91, SD = .84) Costless (M = 4.41, SD = 1.21) z = 4.78, p = .041. 
Pair 2 Costly last note (M = 4.92, SD = 1.17) Costly many notes. (M = 4.55, SD = 
1.07) 
z = 2.59, p = .158. 
Pair 3 Costless first donation (M = 4.54, SD 
= .89) 
Costless money last donation (M = 
4.69, SD = .99) 
z = .357, p = .528. 
Pair 4 Costly meaningful (M = 5.13, SD = 
1.11) 
Costly meaningless (M = 4.28, SD = 
1.15) 
z = 14.45. p = .001. 
Pair 5 Costless meaningful (M = 5.05, SD = 
1.20) 
Costless meaningless (M = 4.01, SD = 
1.20) 
z = 21.31, p < .001. 
 
These results demonstrate that those who gave their own money saw themselves as more 
moral than those who had given money from their work’s charity. This supports the 
costly/costless activation of moral identity theory proposed by Gneezy et al. (2012) and others. 
However, the strongest and most reliable manipulation is based on donations which financially 
meant a lot to the participant. Costliness – manipulated by distinguishing the financial level to 
which the donation is perceived to matter to the individual – significantly affects the level to 
which moral identity is activated.  As I hypothesise that moral identity mediates the effect of 
costliness on subsequent pro-social behaviour based on extensive literature previously discussed, 
it is critically important to use a reliable manipulation of costliness. Further, this costliness 
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distinction is consistent with the way cost is perceived by consumers in the real world, and can 
increase our knowledge of the effect of pro-social cost on consumer behaviour. 
To further understand what was motivating the moral identity scores, I conducted a two-
way factor analysis of variance (ANOVA) of costliness and meaningfulness on moral identity 
scores in Pairs 4 and 5. I found that 0.5% (Partial Eta Squared = .005) of the variance in moral 
identity was due to costliness F (1, 155) = .829, p = .364 – which is not significant. 11.4% 
(Partial Eta Squared = .114) of the variance in moral identity was due to meaningfulness 
 F (1, 155) = 26.165, p < .001 – which was significant. Those in the costly group reported higher 
levels of moral identity (M = 4.53) than those in the costless group (M = 4.01) but it was not 
significant p = .364. Those in the meaningful group reported higher levels of moral identity 
(M = 5.088) than those in the meaningless group (M = 4.14) – which was significant p < .001. 
The interaction effect of costliness on meaningfulness is higher for meaningless (mean difference 
= 0.526) than it is for meaningful, but it is not significant F (1, 155) = .829, p = .315.  These 
results support a view that when costliness and meaningfulness of that cost are present, 
meaningfulness was driving the effect on moral identity. 
Analysing the level to which treatments were perceived to be costly, a univariate analysis 
did find a significant omnibus effect F (9,385) = 4.03, p < .001.  A more focused pairwise 
comparison did not find differences between the costly (Pair 1) group (M = 3.12, SD = 1.60) and 
the costless group (M = 2.58, SD = 1.74) z = 10.69, p = .054, the costless first donation (Pair 3) 
group (M = 3.23, SD = 1.70) and those in the costless last donation (M = 3.71, SD = 1.34)  
z = 4.13, p = .189, the costly meaningful (Pair 4) group (M = 3.38, SD = 1.43) and the costly 
meaningless group (M = 3.05, SD = 1.72) z = 2.11, p = .361. However, those in the costly last 
note (Pair 2) group reported a higher cost of the initial donation mean (M = 3.98, SD = 1.79) than 
those in the costly many notes treatment group (M = 2.68, SD = 1.45) z = 33.27, p = .001, the 
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costless meaningful (Pair 5) group (M = 2.85, SD = 1.70) and the costless meaningless group 
(M = 4.08, SD = 1.61) z = 29.73, p = .002.   
Taking this into account, costliness was most effective in activating moral identity when 
the donation included cash and meant a lot to the giver. I therefore adjusted the manipulation of 
costliness to be costly versus not costly, consisting of a financial donation personally made which 
is an amount which means a lot (or doesn’t mean a lot) to the giver.  Taking all this together, I 
predict that manipulating costliness in a manner which is perceived as meaning a lot versus not 
meaning a lot will more effectively activate moral identity to be higher versus lower.  
Experiment 3 incorporates this manipulation of costliness.  
When analysing the results of the altruism-dependent variables, I found no significant 
effects of the independent variables or the measure of moral identity on either altruism-
dependent variable.  I interpreted this to be a failure on my part to design the dependent variables 
in a way which worked in the MTurk environment.  Based on this, and building on what I had 
found not to work, further modifications were made for subsequent experiments. 
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Experiment 3:  The perception of moral costliness, its effect on subsequent behaviour and 
moral identity as mediator. 
Design and procedure 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Experiment 3 built on the findings of the pre-tests particularly the findings that 
perception of cost to mean a lot (costly) versus not mean a lot (not costly) was more effective in 
activating moral identity than previous experiments were the distinctions were between costly 
and costless.  This perception of cost and its effect on moral identity was explored further in 
experiment 3.  
Subjects were recruited using crowd-sourced data collection, namely Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk). As a crowd-sourced study, in order to meet the guidelines established 
by Goodman and Paolacci (2017) for crowd-sourced experimental design, this experiment design 
described the task generically to avoid the risk of self-selection, used only participants pre-
registered with MTurk, attended to any participant requests promptly, and respectfully managed 
the pool.  In addition, the manipulations, while following published studies where possible, were 
novel in their design to manage non-naïve participants.  Participants who had participated in any 
previous study relating to this research were filtered out.  Participants were paid a fair wage, 
based on the principle of being paid no less than the US minimum wage of $7.92 USD per hour 
Y: Prosocial (Donate/Discount) X: Costliness (costly/not costly) 
M: Moral identity (Gneezy et al., 2012) 
Figure 4: Manipulation of costliness and a measure of moral identitymoral identity 
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(United States Department of Labor, Retrieved 15 January 2017), and given adequate time to 
complete the tasks based on calculations of time from previous manipulation checks. In all other 
aspects of the experiment design, this research complied with the guidelines on ethical behaviour 
as outlined by Goodman and Paolacci (2017). The average time taken participants was one 
minute 59 seconds. This effectively equates to an hourly rate of $10.50 USD. 
In this experiment, I further explore the relationship between the perceived costliness of 
an initial donation on subsequent pro-social consumer behaviour. I hypothesised that a donation 
perceived as costly, relative to a donation perceived as not costly, would increase a subsequent 
donation behaviour (H1).  I also hypothesised that a donation perceived as costly, relative to a 
donation perceived as not costly, would activate moral identity, which will mediate subsequent 
donation behaviour (H2). 6  
 I conducted a power analysis using GPower (Faul & Erdfelder, 1992) with power 
 (1 - β) set at 0.80 and α = .05, one-tailed based on the effects found in the pre-test where 
meaningfulness was the main driver of changes to moral identity (R2 = .228). This showed that 
sample sizes should be N = 23 to have enough power to detect an effect of costliness on moral 
identity.  However, as Gneezy et al. (2012) had found a smaller effect between moral identity and 
subsequent donation behaviour (which I did not find in my pre-test), and as I had included 
additional factors of cognition, affect and a control, I increased the sample size to be higher than 
identified in the power test for my first replication study to ensure I had an adequate sample size 
for the effects I hypothesised I would find.  
                                               
6 The research presented here is the moral identity mediation element of a larger study of three hundred and 
one participants where I also sought to test the level to which an affective or cognitive mindset moderated the effects 
of costliness and influenced subsequent altruistic behavior.  I did this by manipulating participants to inspect their 
feelings/thoughts towards the donation scenario, building on the work of Epstein and Pacini (1999), Strack and 
Deutsch (2004), Pham (1998) and Scharz and Clore (2007). As this was not core to my thesis, this aspect of the 
experiment has not been included in this document.  A complete outline of the full study design and results is 
provided in Appendix 3. It is not included here as it introduces the moderating effect of focus which is not key to 
this thesis. 
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Seventy-seven participants were recruited through MTurk. The study was run between 15 
and 18 April 2018. The sample included 36 males (46.8%) and 41 females (53.2%).  The age 
breakdown of participants was 4% aged 18–24, 36% aged 25–34, 31% aged 35–44, 15% aged 
45–54 and 14% aged over 55.  All participants were from the United States to limit variation of 
interpretation of the manipulations and any language barriers.  Participants were paid a fair wage, 
based on the principle of being paid no less than the US minimum wage of $7.92 USD per hour 
(United States Department of Labor, Retrieved 15 January 2017). It was expected that the 
experiment would take about 8 minutes depending on the selected DV.  The average time taken 
was 3.08 minutes. Participants were paid $1.00 each. This effectively equates to an hourly rate of 
$19.48 USD. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: costly and not costly, and 
asked to complete the measure of moral identity (Aquino et al., 2009; Aquino & Reed II, 2002; 
Gneezy et al., 2012; Reed et al., 2007) as used in previous experiments. 
Using the scenario from the pre-test, participants were then asked to try to imagine they 
were in the following situation. ‘There is a charity display at your workplace where you normally 
sit for lunch. Spend a moment thinking about being in that place and listening to a charity 
presentation as if it is really happening. After listening to the presentation, you make a donation 
to the charity which financially means a lot to you’ (costly), versus ‘… doesn’t mean a lot to you’ 
(costless).  As a manipulation check, both groups were asked to identify in US dollars how much 
might this be.  
Following the treatment, participants were asked to give feedback on a proposed 
introductory offer a well-known restaurant chain is looking at running for new online customers. 
The offer new customers the chance to take some or all of a 25% discount, with the remainder of 
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the 25% donated to a local charity. What percentage would you take as a discount versus give as 
a donation? (must add up to 25%). This was the dependent variable. 
After this, participants were asked some filler questions, an additional manipulation 
check question, demographic questions and then thanked for their time.  
Results 
In general, I was interested in comparisons between the costly and not costly conditions, 
donation behaviour and any mediating effect of moral identity.  Perceived costliness was 
measured in the check measure question: ‘Thinking back to the original charity display scenario, 
how costly do you think the original donation would have been to you?’ The costly condition had 
a higher mean (M = 3.54, SD = 1.82) than those in the not costly condition (M = 2.43, SD = 
1.20). A univariate analysis of variance of between subject factors found a significant effect F 
(1,76) = 10.253, p = .002. Those who made a donation ‘which financially means a lot to you’ to 
the charity (costly condition) gave a higher amount and perceived the donation as costlier than 
those who made a donation to charity which financially didn’t mean a lot (not costly). This was 
confirmation that my manipulations of costliness were effective. 
Further, the dependent variable donation mean of those in the costly condition  
(M = 11.16, SD = 7.28) was higher than those in not costly condition (M = 8.01, SD = 6.16).  A 
univariate analysis of variance of between subject factors found the differences between 
conditions in the level of donation-making to be significant F (1,76) = 4.217, p = .044. This 
supports my first hypothesis that an initial donation’s costliness affects subsequent pro-social 
choice in that a costly (not-costly) donation increases (decreases) the tendency to give a 
subsequent donation (take a discount).   
Figure 5: Dependent variable mean scores of percentages given as a donation (out of 
25%) by treatment (costly vs not costly) including standard deviation. 
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The main effect supports a view that pro-social behaviour is more likely to lead to 
subsequent consistency when people perceive the cost to be of an amount that matters (H1). 
However, what explains this relationship? What is the effect of the manipulation of costliness on 
moral identity? Further, what is the effect of moral identity and the other manipulated focuses of 
thinking and affect on subsequent behaviour? 
An analysis of the effects of costliness on moral identity (H2) found that participants in 
the costly group reported higher mean levels of moral identity  
(M = 5.09, SD = .99) than those in the costless group (M = 3.88, SD = 1.25). A univariate 
analysis of variance of between subject factors found the differences to be significant F (1,76) = 
22.152, p < .001. This confirms my second hypothesis that the effect of the perception of cost to 
mean a lot (not mean a lot) is to activate moral identity to be higher (lower). 
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Figure 6: Moral identity mean scores by treatment (costly vs not costly) including 
standard deviation for moral identity treatment. 
 
In terms of differences in donation-making between costly and not costly for those 
focused only on their moral identity, a univariate analysis of variance found differences to be 
significant F (1,76) = 4.217 p = .044.  The costly group had the highest mean of donating (M = 
11.16, SD = 7.28) when compared to the not costly group (M = 8.01, SD = 6.16) 
z = 190.68, p = .044.  
I conducted regression analysis and 5,000 bootstrap resamples using the PROCESS 
macro Version 3 (Hayes, 2017) Model 4 to confirm the significance of the indirect pathway (i.e., 
the path from costliness to donation through moral self-perception). At the bias-corrected 
confidence interval of 95% (-3.478, -.095) I found supporting evidence that moral identity 
mediated the effect of costliness on subsequent donation behaviour.  Results indicated that 
costliness was a significant predictor of moral identity, B = -1.22, SE = .259, p <.001, and that 
MID was a significant predictor of subsequent pro-social behaviour, B = 1.48, SE = .666 p 
= .029. Costliness was no longer a significant predictor of donation behaviour after controlling 
for the mediator, MID, B = -1.34, SE = 1.70, p=.432, consistent with full mediation. Figure 7 
summarises relevant regression analysis between constructs.  
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These findings indicate that the costliness of an initial pro-social action does activate 
moral identity as long as the psychological cost of giving is of a level which means something to 
the individual.  Further, it is this moral mindset which explains 23% (R2 = .2280) of the variance 
between the costly and not costly donation behaviour. 
Additional analysis 
When considering the effect of gender on donation behaviour, while women had a higher 
donation mean (M = 11.73, SD = 7.55) than men (M = 10.29, SD = 6.94) differences were not 
significant F (1,297) = 2.97, p = .086.  Differences between self-reported moral identity scores 
were also not significant between genders. 
Experiment 3 indicated that a costly initial donation activated higher moral identity, 
which in turn resulted in higher subsequent donation-making.  I concluded therefore that moral 
identity mediated the relationship between costliness and donation behaviour, confirming 
experiment 3’s hypotheses. 
My research to date has identified that when moral identity is activated, the effect of 
costliness on subsequent behaviour is mediated.  Donation amounts which mean a lot to us as 
givers impress upon us a sense of morality in that we see ourselves as more helpful and less 
X: Costliness 
M:  Moral identity 
Z: Subsequent Pro-Social Choice 
B = -1.22, SE = .259, p = <.001 
B = 1.48, SE = .666, p = .029 
  B = -1.34, SE = 1.70, p=.432 
  Indirect effect: B = -1.805, 95% CI = -3.478, -.095 
Figure 7: Mediation analysis, Experiment 3 
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selfish.  We continue to behave that way when given another opportunity. This is the consistency 
effect I have sought to establish.  Donation amounts which don’t mean much to us as givers, 
doesn’t send the same signal to our moral sense of self without the ongoing consistent donation 
effect.  
However, Experiment 2 demonstrated that a focus on how someone feels after an initial 
financial donation leads to higher levels of subsequent donation behaviour than a focus on moral 
identity. But what kind of affect matters? Do differences in the costliness of the initial donation 
generate differences in positive feelings about the donation amount? For example, does a 
donation which means a lot to you leave you feeling more positive about the donation?  And, 
does this matter? Would you donate more if you felt particularly positive about the donation?  
Experiment 4 focuses on this aspect of our pursuit of consistent moral behaviour after an initial 
moral action. 
Experiment 4: Does positive affect mediate costliness?  
To date, I have been able to find consistency effects of higher moral identity subsequent 
to a costly donation, when this donation is of an amount which means a lot to the individual. 
Experiment 4 is designed to return to the second part of my original inquiry, namely: does an 
initial financial donation which is perceived to be costly (not costly) increase (not increase) 
positive affect, mediating the effect of costliness on subsequent pro-social behaviour (H3)?  
Design and procedure 
 
Y: Prosocial (Discount/Donate) X: Costliness (costly/costless) 
M: Positive Affect 
Figure 8: Mediation Model of Positive Affect in Experiment 4 
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My findings will contribute to the literature by identifying the underlying mechanisms 
responsible for consistent subsequent behaviour after an initial moral action – namely, the 
influence of costliness on moral identity and affect. 
I conducted a priori power analyses using GPower (for a full description, see Erdfelder, 
Faul, & Bucher, 1996) with power (1 - β) set at 0.80 and α = .05, one-tailed. This showed that 
sample sizes should be N = 105 to have enough power to detect an effect of costliness on positive 
affect and subsequent pro-social behaviour, and a main effect of costliness on subsequent pro-
social behaviour. Sample sizes of 105+ respondents are adequate to conduct mediation analyses 
with small size effects based a Cohen’s d value of .242 found in my previous study. 
Table 5: 2 x 4 Between-subject experiment design of costliness on subsequent pro-social 
behaviour. 
Treatment Dependent Variable 
Costly vs Not Costly  % donate vs % discount 
 
Two hundred and thirty-one participants were recruited through MTurk. The study was 
run between 2 and 3 July, 2018. The sample included 127 males (55%) and 104 females (45%).  
The age breakdown of participants was 2% aged 18–24, 37% aged 25–34, 29% aged 35–44, 20% 
aged 45–54 and 12% aged over 55.  All participants were from the United States to limit 
variation of interpretation of the manipulations and any language barriers.  
Participants were paid an amount for their participation which represented an hourly rate 
of more than $US7.92 the US minimum wage (United States Department of Labor, Retrieved 15 
January 2017). It was expected that the experiment would take about 8 minutes depending on the 
selected DV.  The average time taken was 3.05 minutes   Participants were randomly assigned to 
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one of two conditions and two measures with a single DV.  114 participants were in the costly 
group and 117 were in the not costly group.  
The design of this experiment was in all ways the same as Experiment 3 except that in 
Experiment 4 a measure of positive affect7 replaced the measure of moral identity, and other 
factors (cognition, affect and control) were removed. The measure of positive affect asked 
participants to reflect back to the donation scenario and to answer the following question: using a 
7-point Likert scale – not at all to very much – in both cases, how positive would making this 
financial donation make you feel?  
Results 
In terms of the effectiveness of my manipulation, the costly group had a higher mean of 
perceived costliness (M = 3.77, SD = 1.73) than the not costly group (M = 2.07, SD = .89). A 
univariate analysis of variance of between subject factors found significant differences between 
costly and not costly groups F (1,229) = 89.34, p <.001. Those who donated to the charity an 
amount that financially means a lot to them perceived the donation to be costlier than the not 
costly manipulation. Further, the costly group imagined their donation would be on average 
higher (M = $67.72 SD = $111.90) than those in the not-costly group (M = $13.75, SD = $18.50). 
When assessing the effect of costliness on subsequent donation behaviour, those in the 
costly condition had a higher donation mean (M =10.32, SD = 7.73) than those in the not costly 
condition (M = 9.51, SD = 7.22), however it was not significant F (1,229) = .673, p = .413.    
This finding differs from the results in my previous experiment. My previous findings indicate 
that moral identity is an explanation for the effect of costliness on subsequent pro-social 
                                               
7 In this experiment I was particularly focused on positive affect, building on the work of researchers on 
happiness and positive affect.  I did, however, include a measure of negative affect, asking participants: How 
negative would making this financial donation make you feel?  As the role of negative affect is not a focus of my 
hypothesis or theory development, and Experiment 1 findings on negative affect were not significant, I did not 
pursue findings based on this measure, and therefore findings of this measure are not included.   
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behaviour; however when participants are focused on the level to which they feel positive about 
the donation, the effect of costliness is not the same.  
In terms of positive affect, the costly group had a higher mean of positive affect  
(M = 5.10, SD = 1.53) than those in the not costly group (M = 3.93, SD = 1.50). A univariate 
analysis of variance of between subject factors found significant differences in positive affect 
between conditions F (1,236) = 34.02, p < .001.  That is to say, those who made a costly 
donation to the charity felt more positive towards the donation than those in the not costly 
condition. 
 
Figure 9: Positive affect mean scores by treatment (costly vs not costly)  
including standard deviation. 
 
I conducted regression analysis and 5,000 bootstrap resamples using the PROCESS 
macro Version 3 (Hayes, 2017) to confirm the significance of the indirect pathway (i.e., the path 
from costliness to donation) through positive affect. At the bias-corrected confidence interval of 
95% (-2.94, -.94) I found supporting evidence that positive affect mediated the effect of 
costliness on subsequent donation behaviour.  Costliness was a significant predictor of positive 
affect, B = -1.16, SE = .200, p <.001, and positive affect was a significant predictor of 
subsequent pro-social behaviour, B = 1.59, SE = .309 p <.001. Costliness was no longer a 
significant predictor of donation behaviour after controlling for the mediator, MID, B = 1.04,  
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SE = 1.00, p=.299, consistent with full mediation. Figure 10 summarises relevant regression 
analysis between constructs.  
 
Experiment 4 indicated that a costly initial donation led to higher positive affect, which in 
turn resulted in higher donation making.  I concluded therefore that positive affect mediated the 
relationship between costliness and donation behaviour. Further, positive affect explains 10% (R2 
= .1065) of the variance between the costly and not costly donation behaviour. 
Additional analysis 
When considering the effect of gender on donation behaviour, while women had a higher 
donation mean (M = 10.96, SD = 7.18) than men (M = 9.05, SD = 7.62) differences were not 
significant F (1,229) = 3.78, p = .053.  Differences between the experience of positive affect 
were also not significant between genders. 
But what of the effect of positive affect on donation size? As positive affect is influential, 
perhaps there may be an unintended additional effect on the size of the donation. While not 
originally hypothesized, a regression analysis was used to investigate the possibility that positive 
affect may moderate the effect of costliness on subsequent pro-social behaviour with the 
PROCESS macro Version 3 (Hayes, 2017) Model 1. The interaction (group x positive affect) was 
related to donation size B = 1.84, SE = .939, p = .05, with the variance in donation accounted for 
X: Costliness 
M:  Positive Affect 
Z: Subsequent Pro-Social Choice 
B = -1.16, SE = .200, p = <.001 
B = 1.59, SE = .309, p < .001 
  B = 1.04, SE = 1.00, p=.299 
  Indirect effect: B = -1.805, 95% CI = -3.478, -.095 
Figure 10: Mediation Analysis Experiment 
4 
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by the predictors being 11% (R2 = .1148). The effect of positive affect in the costly condition on 
donation behaviour is different to the effect of positive affect on donation behaviour in the not 
costly condition F (1, 236) = 28.33, p < .001, however both have a positive effect on future 
donation size.  Figure 11 shows that the more positive an individual feels about the initial 
donation, the higher the amount they subsequently donate. 
Figure 11: Effect of positive affect means on donation size in Experiment 4 
 
Discussion 
Experiment 4 demonstrates that variations in the initial costliness of a donation result in 
differing levels to which the giver experiences positive affect. This experience of higher positive 
affect explains the relationship between the initial donation and subsequent consistent pro-social 
behaviour.  This confirms my hypothesis that positive affect is an additional mediating 
mechanism explaining the effect of costliness with the maintenance of positive affect responsible 
for the resulting consistent pro-social behaviour. Interestingly, I also found that the level of 
subsequent donation is relative to how positive a person feels about the initial donation 
regardless of the amount of the initial donation. This would suggest that messages accompanying 
pro-social actions should highlight the positive feelings, the ‘warm glow’ which is experienced 
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by doing good things, in order to achieve higher financial contributions subsequently. This 
finding particularly contributes to the work of Andrade (2005).  My finding demonstrates that 
pro-social costliness has a role in the way dynamic affect operates to guide future behaviour. The 
level to which an individual identifies that they feel positive about the amount they have 
contributed plays a major affective role in guiding behaviour (Andrade, 2005). 
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General discussion 
This research is the first to explore and measure the level to which consistent ongoing 
altruistic behaviour will depend on how the consumer perceives the costliness of a prior 
altruistic act and to establish the role of moral identity and positive affect. I have been able to 
demonstrate, through four experiments, the role of moral identity and positive affect in mediating 
the effect of cost to promote consistent subsequent moral behaviour.  My hypotheses are collated 
in Table 6 for easy reference. 
Table 6: Summary Table of Hypotheses 
Thesis Hypotheses Finding 
H1: A costly (vs. costless) prosocial action increases a subsequent prosocial 
behaviour’ 
Not 
Rejected 
H2: A donation perceived as costly (not costly) will activate higher (lower) moral 
identity, which will mediate the effects of costliness on subsequent pro-social 
behaviour 
Not 
rejected 
H3: A donation which is perceived to be costly (not costly) will increase (not 
increase) the level of positive affect, which will mediate the effects of costliness on 
subsequent pro-social behaviour. 
Not 
rejected 
Experiment 1 
H1 A costly/costless altruistic action will lead to subsequent 
increases/decreases in prosocial behavior. 
Rejected 
H2 A costly altruistic action, relative to a costless one, increases levels of 
moral self-perception, leading to increased consistency on a subsequent 
pro-social behavior 
Rejected 
H3 A costly altruistic action, relative to a costless one, increases levels of 
positive affect (as demonstrated by happiness, mood and connectedness), 
leading to increased consistency in a subsequent pro-social behavior. 
Rejected 
Experiment 2 
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Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that while I initially expected a licensing effect, based 
on the significant number of studies across many disciplines providing evidence of such 
compensatory behaviour (Eisenberg, 2010; Merritt et al., 2010; Sachdeva et al., 2009), I was not 
able to replicate these effects. I did not find that the manipulation of costliness, modeled on 
Gneezy et al. (2012), activated moral identity as the authors found, nor the subsequent 
consistency/licensing effects. Experiment 3 indicated that an initial donation which meant a lot to 
the individual did activate higher moral identity, which did mediate the effect of costliness on 
donation behavior leading to more consistency in subsequent behaviour. Finally, Experiment 4 
demonstrated that the effect of the initial cost of donations on positive affect is that higher 
costliness results in higher positive affect and a greater likelihood of subsequent pro-social 
behaviour.  Further, the more positive a person feels about the initial donation, the larger the 
quantum of donation – regardless of the initial donation amount. Taken as a whole, these findings 
contribute to the moral behaviour, moral consistency and moral cost literature. 
Dynamics of financial moral costliness 
H1 A costly/costless altruistic action will lead to subsequent 
increases/decreases in prosocial behavior, mediated by moral identity. 
Rejected 
Experiment 3 
H1 A donation perceived as costly (not costly), will increase (not increase) 
subsequent donation behaviour.   
Not 
rejected 
H2 A donation perceived as costly (not costly), will activate moral identity, 
mediating the effects of costliness on subsequent pro-social behaviour 
Not 
rejected 
Experiment 4 
H1 A donation perceived as costly (not costly), will increase (not increase) 
subsequent donation behaviour.   
Not 
rejected 
H2 A donation perceived as costly (not costly), will increase positive affect,  
mediating the effects of costliness on subsequent pro-social behaviour. 
Not 
rejected 
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Taking the lessons from all four manipulations of costliness into account I believe that 
while the amounts in the first two experiments (as modelled on Gneezy et al. (2012)) were the 
same as those used by Gneezy et al. (2012), there were differences which may have led to the 
differing results.  
1. The amounts in the experiments which were numerically comparable had differing 
purchasing power. Perhaps one reason why the fixed monetary amounts used by Gneezy et al, 
(2012) may not have had the same activating effect on moral identity in my research is that the 
perceived psychological cost of giving varies between individuals and their differing reference 
points. In this instance, if individuals use purchasing power as a reference point to determine 
psychological cost, building on the work of Wiepking and Breeze (2012) and Polman et al. 
(2018), what $5 USD could buy in the United States and what $5 AUD could buy in Australia 
are different.  This may have empowered the perception of $US5 in the US experiments of 
Gneezy et al. (2012) and disempowered the perception of $A5 in the present research, thereby 
resulting in a perception of costliness in the US context but not in the Australian context. 
2. The amounts related very differently to average wages in each country. Perhaps this 
provided a very different perception of the value of both the thank-you payment ($5) and the 
donation ($2) in terms of earning power.  In 2012, when Gneezy et al. (2012) conducted their 
research, the hourly federal minimum hourly wage rate in the United States was USD 7.25.  At 
the time I conducted one of my experiments using the $5 thank-you payment and $2 donation 
amount of Gneezy et al. (2012), the minimum hourly wage in Australia (AUD) in 20158 was 
$17.29.  When converted to USD, this at the time was on average USD 13.03, almost twice the 
US wage. Based on this, the loss of $2 would seem less significant in Australia 
                                               
8  For the purpose of this comparison, I have selected the date of 1 July 2015. 
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3. The dependent variable in the Gneezy et al. (2012) paper which did activate moral 
identity in my research was a higher financial amount. Perhaps sacrificing $5 from $25 
generated a different perception of costliness simply because what was to be gained was a higher 
amount than in the initial manipulation (independent variable). Perhaps the size of the reference 
number, $5 +/- $2 in the independent variable versus $25 +/- $5 in the dependent variable, is 
another factor which individuals consider in determining the psychological cost of giving.  In my 
research when using the Gneezy et al. (2012) experimental design, the $2 donation and the $5 
thank-you payment had a different effect on moral identity to the dependent variable which was a 
$25 windfall, plus or minus $5.  
4. Relationship with amounts individuals would normally donate. If a product costs $100 
and the pro-social cost is an additional $10, that might not be considered a particularly high 
impost by people who purchase $100 items regularly. However, if it is a special purchase by 
someone who rarely makes $100 purchases, it might seem a very costly additional amount.  In 
my research, perhaps the cohort donated $2 regularly, and for them the amount may not have 
seemed as significant as it was for the Gneezy et al. (2012) cohort.  
5. Financially specified versus non-financially specified.  The amount used by 
Gneezy et al. (2012) and in my first two experiments was prescribed.  I abandoned this in the 
final two experiments with convincing results. Considering the referential nature of the perceived 
cost of giving discussed above, it is understandable why using a non-prescribed financial 
manipulation which was self-referenced to either mean a lot or not to participants in subsequent 
experiments was successful in activating moral identity and affect. This suggests that other 
factors need to be understood which may differentiate a donation which is to be seen as costly 
from one that is not costly when seeking to activate moral identity and positive affect as 
mediators of consistent subsequent behaviour 
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6. Forced donation versus free choice. The dependent variable in the game in 
Experiments 1 and 2 was a free choice, whereas the initial manipulation (independent variable) 
was a fixed, forced donation. As I found activation effects of moral identity after the free choice 
but not after the forced donation, it is reasonable to suppose that this difference in donation 
behaviour may have influenced the perception of costliness to be higher or lower.   
My findings suggest that, in order to provide generalisable results, consideration must be 
given to the relative nature of the perceived cost of giving.  Further research on the effect of 
these individual factors on perceived costliness is warranted. 
With reference to Gneezy et al. (2012) and the role of costliness on moral identity, 
perhaps there is a level to which moral identity needs to be activated to adequately counter 
licensing, or a floor level to which it must fall to lead to licensing. 
The repeated measure of moral identity identified significant differences between those 
who told the truth (potentially getting less of a payoff thereby making a more financially costly 
altruistic decision) and those who lied (potentially getting more of a payoff and making a selfish 
(not costly) decision).  This supported my further enquiry into costliness, its effect on moral 
identity and, potentially, subsequent moral consistency, and contributes to the knowledge of the 
dynamics of costliness described above. Further, I was able to demonstrate affective responses to 
the costly/costless distinction over the control group, suggesting further attention to positive 
affect was warranted.  
In particular, this thesis presents a case for the relative nature of the cost of pro-social 
behaviour, in that pro-social choices come at different price points which mean different things to 
different people.  This psychological cost of giving matters when it comes to the activation of 
moral identity and affect, mediators of costliness on subsequent pro-social behaviour.  That is to 
say that, while what is perceived to be costly may differ from one consumer to another, this 
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psychological cost distinction plays an important role in the level to which moral identity and 
positive affect are changed by the donation or pro-social action.  
Contributions and future research 
This research adds to the literature on the relationship between moral behaviour and 
moral consistency by highlighting the role that the price of giving, moral identity and positive 
affect play in driving consistency effects.  Further, my work also contributes to the literature on 
how positive affect increases prosocial behaviour such that regardless of costliness, a focus on 
positive affect increases the size of subsequent donations as compared to a focus on moral self-
perception. 
Contribution to moral consistency 
This research provides support for the idea that moral consistency is more likely after a 
financially costly moral action than an action where the financial cost is not at a meaningful level 
or is perceived as costless. This builds on the work of Gneezy et al. (2012) in particular by 
confirming the role of moral identity on the relationship between costliness and moral 
consistency. I contribute to their findings by demonstrating that there are many nuances to the 
perceived psychological cost of giving. Further, I suggest that pro-social cost, be it a donation or 
a purchase, is relative, in that there is a financial cost of giving and a psychological perception of 
what that amount means which differs between individuals.  This means that when a pro-social 
action or donation is of an amount which is perceived as costly to an individual, regardless of 
their income, or other personal circumstances, the activation of moral identity is higher than if 
the pro-social action or donation doesn’t mean a lot (i.e. is not costly).   
 As moral behaviour is embedded within a system of competing forces which result in 
actions designed to balance these forces (Boehm, 2012; Sachdeva et al., 2009), my research 
contributes to the role that the psychological cost of giving plays in this balancing act. I propose 
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that, as Shao et al. (2008), Aquino and Reed II (2002) and Gneezy et al. (2012) suggest, moral 
regulation mechanisms are at play such that before the initial action, the individual may perceive 
themselves as a moral 5, but after a costly donation, they now perceive themselves as a moral 7 
and act consistently subsequently to stay at that level. My research contributes to the work of 
authors on moral consistency by adding further understanding to the role of the psychological 
cost of giving in triggering moral regulatory mechanisms which drive consistent moral 
behaviour.  
I propose that my work demonstrates how an elevated moral identity may guard against 
licensing. The extent to which an individual is focused on their elevated moral sense of self by 
the presence of a costly pro-social action determines the consistency of subsequent pro-social 
behaviour.  In a consumer setting, this suggests that when a pro-social product comes at a higher 
cost, focusing the consumer on how much more of a moral person they are because of the cost 
they have incurred may avoid subsequent licensing behaviour. 
Contribution to the role of cost in pro-social behaviour 
I have identified a direct relationship between costliness and consistent subsequent 
behaviour.  My research demonstrates that the psychological cost of giving activates the 
cognitive construct of moral identity and the feelings of positive affect, mediating the effect of 
costliness on subsequent pro-social behaviour. This research also builds on the work of Gneezy 
et al. (2012) in that it provides an additional explanation for the consistency effects found for 
costliness in their research, which was focused solely on moral identity.  That is to say that both 
moral self-perception and positive affect mediate the effect of costliness on subsequent 
behaviour, although I have found that there are nuances in the way costliness operates in relation 
to both constructs. 
ONE GOOD DEED DESERVES ANOTHER 86 
 
Contribution to the work of behavioural economists and the effect of the price of 
giving/psychological cost of giving 
My findings extend the understanding of the emotional and identity effects of distinctions 
between different kinds of pro-social costs and the levels to which they lead to consistency. In 
particular, my findings confirm those of Lilley and Slonim (2014) in showing that a focus on 
positive affect increases the quantum of donation making.  I add to their understanding of this by 
identifying nuances in the moderating effect of focusing on positive affect on subsequent 
donation behaviour.  While the design of Lilley and Slonim (2014) research is limited to a single 
donation example, I have been able to demonstrate these effects on sequential donations.  
Perhaps while the level to which one experiences a ‘warm glow’ differs between pure altruists 
and impure altruists, this is because pure altruists act in a cognitive frame and moral identity is at 
play. This may mean that the effect found by Lilley and Slonim (2014) in their pure altruism 
condition is explained by a shadowing effect of the moral identity of one individual on another 
and not just the posited effect of perceived charitable utility.  
In addition, while considerable research in the field of economics has focused on 
donation behaviour, little attention has been paid to the level to which perceived costliness 
affects subsequent donation behaviour.  My research contributes to the understanding not just of 
the contexts in which individuals donate and then even donate again, but also of two underlying 
mediators of that effect: moral identity and positive affect.  My findings suggest that when the 
cost of giving is perceived to be high, moral identity explains subsequent consistent behaviour.  
When individuals are focused on how they feel about the initial donation, again, the effect of 
initial costliness on subsequent donation behaviour is mediated, this time by affect. 
As they relate to affect protection and affect management, my findings extend those of 
Russell (2003) in that I have shown how the costliness of an initial action influences levels of 
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positive episodic affect.  My findings also contribute to the work of researchers who consider the 
effect of volunteering on health and happiness such as Post (2005). My findings would suggest 
that a costly pro-social action would also be connected to health and happiness, extending Post 
(2005) theory to apply to financially-based altruism. Likewise, while emotional regulation 
literature (Andrade, 2005; Kemp & Kopp, 2011) may have shown that individuals pursue 
positive affect in order to dispel negative emotions, my research suggests that they also pursue 
positive affect in order to maintain those positive feelings. That is to say that those who make a 
costly donation choose a following action which both is consistent with their moral identity, and 
also ensures the happy feeling generated from being altruistic is maintained – by being altruistic 
again. 
While I found that a costly moral action generates a higher level of positive affect than a 
not-costly action, I also found that those who are focused on how they feel – their positive affect 
– give a higher subsequent financial donation than those focused on their moral identity. This 
supports the idea that when a product in the market has a pro-social attribute, whether it costs 
more or not, marketers should focus on the positive emotional response which purchasing this 
item can give the consumer.  My findings suggest that a consumer would be more likely 
subsequently to purchase another pro-social product even if the price is higher than its 
conventional equivalent in order to maintain that level of positive affect. Future research could 
explore the time horizon of this activity and any domain constraints which may be relevant.  
While this research focuses on an initial altruistic action followed by a consumer choice, 
future research could address an initial pro-social consumer choice followed by a subsequent one 
to mirror more closely a consumer shopping experience in a field setting. In addition, as not all 
pro-social costs are financial, future research could consider the effect of volunteering and other 
in-kind donation behaviour which may vary in time or effort costs.  For example, perhaps moral 
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identity is activated and subsequent behaviour is consistently altruistic based on the relative 
value individuals place on their time. To build on my contribution to the understanding of the 
psychological cost of giving, further work is needed to understand the effect of individual factors 
on the perception of costliness and how this translates to consumer purchasing behaviour.  
Understanding the nuances in cost perceptions is important when crafting marketing messages to 
encourage consistent subsequent prosocial behaviour when cost is a factor. Given the variation in 
the range of valued identified as costly or not costly in my research, it cannot be assumed that 
what one customer perceives as a high price is also perceived as high by others.  Additional 
research would be of value in deepening our understanding of nuances in this area. 
Further research could also consider any time horizon effect of costliness on consistency.  
For example, how many subsequent decisions are affected by a psychologically costly pro-social 
choice?  Consideration could be given to the many referential aspects to psychological costliness 
which may also drive consistency and potentially licensing behaviour and the shopping domains 
in which they operate.  In an online environment, perhaps the order in which products are placed, 
and their relative value, may have a combined effect: if, for example, a conventional product, 
such as toilet paper (value $2.50) is shown on the screen before a pro-social item such as free-
range eggs (value $7.50), does this increase the perceived cost of the prosocial attribute, making 
it feel more expensive or costly? 
From my findings it is possible to conclude that brands with higher-priced but pro-social 
products need not see customers’ decisions to choose them as a one-off, but can work to engage 
those customers in an ongoing, consistent relationship by identifying the positive feelings which 
come from buying a product which is doing good for the world and good for other people.  This 
is more likely to increase the level to which they will spend on subsequent products which are 
also good for the planet and its people. 
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Charities can learn lessons from this also by recognising that there is considerable 
flexibility in the level to which money is perceived to have a psychological cost and that this 
positively affects subsequent donor behaviour.  Rather than looking for high one-off donations, 
charities might do well to consider higher donations as an indicator of moral identity strength 
and might forge an ongoing, consistent relationship with donors in the expectation of regular 
subsequent donations.  
In a consumer setting, engaging with consumers who purchase higher-cost pro-social 
products in a way which acknowledges the impact their financial contribution has on their moral 
sense of self may be the key to ensuring loyalty and consistency in subsequent pro-social 
purchases. Further field experimentation would be useful for putting my findings into effect. 
Finally, perhaps my inability to establish licensing effects may have been caused by my 
experiment design. Future research may seek to extend knowledge in this area by focusing 
further on the role of positive affect and moral identity in potential licensing effects. 
There are several important limitations to this present research which are worth 
considering. The first two experiments were conducted using a student cohort.  While these 
experiments provided physical cash and included actual decisions, considering the number of 
factors affecting the psychological cost of giving, there may be limitations in generalisability 
from this cohort.  The remaining experiments were conducted online and were scenario-based.  I 
suggest that there is great value in taking the findings from these experiments into the field and 
into online shopping experiences.  
Conclusion 
My research contributes not only to the body of academic knowledge, but also to 
corporations’ efforts to embed sustainability goals in the products they market. As Yenipazarli 
and Vakharia (2015) put it, ‘‘Green’ sits at the head of the boardroom charts for many brown 
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companies nowadays.’9  However, while companies are producing more pro-social products and 
consumers seem to say in surveys that they are prepared to pay more for those products, the trend 
is not universal and has not been well understood.  Neilsen (2014) says it is easy to find 
consumers who say they care about the environment but follow through to purchase is still slow.  
My research contributes to our understanding of the perception of cost on pro-social consumer 
behaviour. This is of theoretical but also potentially managerial importance. Understanding how 
messaging around the cost of a prosocial product may focus customers on the positive feelings 
financial sacrifice can give which triggers moral and affect regulation mechanisms. This would 
be valuable in securing consistent patronage of their products for the benefit of their own bottom 
lines, and our impact on earth’s limited resources. 
 
  
                                               
9 Yenipazarli and Vakharia, 2015, p. 304 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Illustrated Experiment 1 Procedure 
When S arrived at the lab and learned the 
purpose and procedure of the study, they were 
directed to individual confidential booths. After 
reading the Participant Information Document 
they signed the Consent Form and S followed 
online instructions on the computer screen in the 
form of a Qualtrics Survey.   
 
Following Gneezy (2012), participants were first 
directed to an envelope on their desk which had 
either $5 (control), $3 (costly) or $5 (costless) in 
$1 coins.  The screen information explained 
what the money was for (thank you) and the 
nature of the charitable contribution. 
 
   
Participants were asked to complete the 
measures for moral identity, happiness, mood 
and connectedness. 
 
First measure Second Measure Third Measure Fourth Measure 
    
S were then directed to a ‘game’ where they had 
to decide to lie or tell the truth, being the 
dependent variable (DV).  They were asked to 
type the last number of their Unikey in a 
message to another person (the receiver) who 
they didn’t know.    
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If they told the truth and gave the correct number, they could earn $25 and the other person $30. 
  
If they lied, and gave an incorrect number, they were eligible to possibly receive $30 with another 
person receiving $25. 
  
Once they had entered the number, they completed repeat versions of the cognitive measures as in 
the Gneezy study, and the affective measures added by us. 
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Appendix 2: The Effect of Focus 
Design and Procedure 
The goal of this study was to identify the effect of costliness on a subsequent good deed depending 
on whether the focus was cognitive (moral identity) or affect (happiness). 
 Method 
Table 7: 3 x 2 Experiment Design 
 Cognitive Focus Affective Focus 
Control No mention of donation/Cognition 
measure 
No mention of donation/Affect manipulation 
Costly Donation reduced from $5 (receive 
$3)/Cognition measure 
Donation reduced from $5 (receive $3)/Affect 
manipulation 
Costless Donation NOT reduced from $5 ($2 
additional to charity)/Cognition measure 
Donation NOT reduced from $5 ($2 additional 
to charity)/Affect manipulation 
 
Participants: Two hundred and five undergraduate marketing students (87 males and 118 
females) were recruited through the Marketing Discipline Subject Pool between 20 and 29 April, 
2015. The sample was principally young adults 20 – 24 years of age (66.8%) with 18% 15-19 
years of age and 15.2% 25-44 years of age. 22 language groups and 32 nationalities were 
represented. Participants received 2 credit marks for their participation. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of three conditions (see table 1): control (N=74), costly altruism 
(N=66) and costless altruism (N=65).  They were also randomly assigned a treatment to focus 
them on either cognition (N=101) or affect (N=104) 
Measures and Manipulations 
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Cognition (Moral Identity Measure). As in the previous study and following Gneezy et al. 
(2012) the same moral identity measure tool was used (Aquino et al., 2009; Aquino & Reed II, 
2002; Gneezy et al., 2012; Reed et al., 2007). This required S to complete a two item, 5-point 
measure (1: not at all to 5: very much) assessing the extent to which they saw themselves as 
“selfish” and “helpful”.  This was designed to measure their perceived moral identity. The items 
were reverse coded and averaged to form a composite measure of moral identity as in Gneezy et 
al. (2012). 
Affect (Happiness). A word-based prime was used, presenting a series of positive, happy 
words with participants being to write two paragraphs about a time when these words applied to 
them under the guise of a handwriting experiment.  In addition and based on the work of Carroll 
and Young (2005), an image consistent with these words was included with the words (see figure 
4). 
Figure 12: Affective Treatment (happiness) in Experiment 2 
 
When measuring the effect of the happiness manipulation we adapted the work of 
Lyubomirsky and Lepper (1999) which was also used by Dunn (2008) using a simple subjective 
measure of happiness which included asking participant to rate their response to the question: 
“Do you feel happy right now?” Participants could respond from on a 5 point scale (1 = no, 5 = 
yes).  
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Independent Variable 
Costless and Costly. As in previous studies, the manipulation was modelled on the work 
of Gneezy et al. (2012) 
Dependent Variable (Truth Telling).  
As in the previous studies, the truth/lie DV was the same. 
Procedure 
As in Study 1 to ensure as close a replication of Gneezy et al. (2012) as possible, the 
study was designed using their published material.  The study design follows Gneezy et al. 
(2012) in all respects except that 50% of participants were randomly assigned to complete the 
moral identity task taken directly from Gneezy et al. (2012) and the remaining 50% were asked 
to complete an activity to focus them on the affect of happiness.  
When S arrived at the lab and learned the 
purpose and procedure of the study, they were 
directed to individual confidential booths. After 
reading the Participant Information Document 
they signed the Consent Form and S followed 
online instructions on the computer screen in the 
form of a Qualtrics Survey.   
 
Following Gneezy (2012), participants 
were first directed to an envelope on their desk 
which had either $5 (control), $3 (costly) or $5 
(costless) in $1 coins.  The screen information 
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explained what the money was for (thank you) 
and the nature of the charitable contribution. 
   
Participants were randomly assigned to the 
cognitive versus affect treatment groups.  They 
then completed one of these two measures. t 
 
  
S were then directed to a ‘game’ where 
they had to decide to lie or tell the truth, being the 
dependent variable (DV).  They were asked to 
type the last number of their Unikey in a message 
to another person (the receiver) who they didn’t 
know.   
 
 
If they told the truth and gave the correct number, they could earn $25 and the other person 
$30. 
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If they lied, and gave an incorrect number, they were eligible to possibly receive $30 with 
another person receiving $25. 
  
Once they had entered the number, they completed repeat versions of the cognitive measures 
as in the Gneezy study, and the affective measures added by us. 
 
Data analysis 
In general, we were interested in comparisons between the three groups (control, costless 
and costly) on the various measures. As the purpose was to replicate the findings by Gneezy et 
al. (2012), we followed the same analyses. One-way ANOVA was used for multi-group 
comparisons, with Mann-Whitney U-tests used for pairwise comparisons between the groups for 
continuous measures. Where the measure was ordinal or nominal (e.g. frequency data, such as 
the percentage of people telling the truth), chi-square tests of independence were used, with 
pairwise tests of proportions to compare the groups. No data were missing. Unless stated 
otherwise, an alpha of .05 was used throughout. 
 
 Results 
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Cognition (Moral Identity).  Of the 101 participants in the cognitive (moral identity 
measure) condition, 39 were in the control group, 30 were in the costly altruism group and 32 
were in the costless altruism group.  Those in the happiness condition did not complete the moral 
identity measure.  
By conducting a univariate analysis of variance on between subject factors, we found 
differences in the level of moral identity between treatment groups were not significant F (2,101) = 
1.74, p =.181.  Participants in the Costly treatment group reported higher levels of moral identity (M = 
3.82, SD = 0.56) than those in the Control treatment (M = 3.72, SD = 0.66) z = -.24, p = .811 and those in 
the Costless treatment group (M = 3.53, SD = 0.61), z = --1.86, p = .063 but it was not significant.  Those 
in the Control treatment group reported higher levels of moral identity than those in the Costless treatment 
group, z = -1.55, p = .122 but it was also not significant (see figure 2). That is to say, as in the first 
experiment, those who had born a cost for the altruism and had $2 automatically deducted from their 
‘thank you’ payment, self-reported no real difference in levels of moral identity than those who did not 
suffer any loss by being altruistic (the costless condition). 
Figure 13: Moral identity Mean Scores by treatment including Standard Deviation 
 
Affect (Happiness).  We did not measure happiness as we had done in Study 1.  This would have 
been useful in hindsight.  
DV - Truth Telling 
3.72 3.53
3.82
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
Control Costless Costly
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Overall findings found no significant difference in the percentage of participants who told 
the truth, Pearson’s analysis X2 (1) = 0.09, p = 0.759. 61.4% of those in the cognitive group told 
the truth and 63.5% in the affective group told the truth. When comparing those who were in the 
cognitive versus affective group by control, costly and costless altruism we found no significance 
between the groups.  61.5% of those in the cognitive control group told the truth and 60% in the 
affective control group told the truth, Pearson’s analysis X2 (1) = 0.18, p = 0.892.  66.7% of those 
in the cognitive costly group told the truth and 55.6% in the affective costly group told the truth, 
Pearson’s analysis X2 (1) = 0.85, p = 0.358. 56.3% of those in the cognitive costless group told 
the truth and 75.8% in the affective costless group told the truth, Pearson’s analysis X2 (1) = 2.76, 
p = 0.097. 
Mediation. Using a variety of analysis techniques, no mediation was found. 
Additional Analysis 
Gender. When comparing those who told the truth by gender, 62.5% of men told the truth 
and 50% of women told the truth, Pearson’s analysis X2 (1) = 3.252, p = 0.071.   
Religiosity. When comparing those who self-rated ‘high’ on the religiosity scale with 
those who self-rated ‘low’, 62.5% of highly religious people told the truth and 50% of low level 
religiosity told the truth, Pearson’s analysis X2 (1) = 3.252, p = 0.071.  
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Tables Study 2 
Moral identity Measure MCostly MCostless MControl p value 
Moral Identity (combined with lower means being lower moral ID) 3.82, SD = 0.56 3.53, SD = 0.61 3.72, SD = 0.66 F (2,101) = 1.74, p =.181 
Moral Identity Gneezy et al. (2012) 3.85 3.26 3.27 P = <0.001 
DV – Truth Telling 
Truth 60.6% 66.2% 60.8% Pearsons analysis X2 (1) = 0.09, p = 0.759. 
A logistical regression analysis was conducted to predict truth telling for participants using costliness (costly versus costless) and focus (moral mindset versus 
happiness mindset) as predictors. X2 (1) 3.396, p = 0.065.  
Description Gneezy et al. (2012). Costly (71%) Control (52%) 
Costless (30%) 
Current Findings: Costly (60.6%) Control (60.8%) Costless 
(66.2%). Pearson’s analysis X2 (2) = .561, p = 0.756 
Replication 
Costly vs Control z=3.60, p <0.001  z=-0.25, p = 0.98  No 
Costly vs Costless z = 3.60, p = <0.001 z = -0.66, p =0.512 No 
Control vs Costless z = 0.37, p =0.71 z = -0.65, p =0.516 No 
Costly versus Costless by Moral Mindset or Happiness Mindset  X2 (1) 3.396, p = 0.065 
Gender: men (64.4%) vs women (61%) p =0.624 
DV – Truth Telling Description Cognitive vs Affective 
Costly: cognitive (66.7%) vs affective (55.6%)  z=0.85, p = 0.358 
Costless: cognitive (56.3%) vs affective (75.8%) z = 2.76, p = 0.097 
Control: cognitive (61.5%) vs affective (60%) z = 0.18, p =0.892 
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Appendix 3: Effect of focus 
Experiment 3:  The perception of moral costliness, its effect on subsequent behaviour and 
moral identity as mediator. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Design and procedure 
Subjects were recruited using crowd-sourced data collection, namely Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk). As a crowd-sourced study, in order to meet the guidelines established 
by Goodman and Paolacci (2017) for crowd-sourced experimental design, this experiment design 
described the task generically to avoid the risk of self-selection, used only participants pre-
registered with MTurk, attended to any participant requests promptly, and respectfully managed 
the pool.  In addition, the manipulations, while following published studies where possible, were 
novel in their design to manage non-naïve participants.  Participants who had participated in any 
previous study relating to this research were filtered out.  Participants were paid a fair wage, 
based on the principle of being paid no less than the US minimum wage of $7.92 USD per hour 
(United States Department of Labor, Retrieved 15 January 2017), and given adequate time to 
complete the tasks based on calculations of time from previous manipulation checks. In all other 
aspects of the experiment design, this research complied with the guidelines on ethical behaviour 
Y: Prosocial (truth/lie) X: Costliness (costly/costless) 
M: Moral identity (Gneezy et al., 2012) 
M: Affect (happiness, mood, connectedness) 
Figure 14: Three factor manipulation of mindset and a measure of moral identity 
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as outlined by Goodman and Paolacci (2017). The average time taken participants was one 
minute 59 seconds. This effectively equates to an hourly rate of $10.50 USD. 
In this experiment, we explore the relationship between the perceived costliness of an 
initial donation on subsequent pro-social consumer behaviour. Further, we introduce additional 
personal reflection tasks (including affect, cognition and moral identity) to manipulate the way 
participants focus on the initial donation.  We hypothesised (H1) that an initial donation’s 
costliness would have a main effect on subsequent pro-social choice in that a costly (not-costly) 
donation increases (decreases) the tendency to give a subsequent donation (take a discount). We 
also hypothesised (H2) that the effect of the of the initial donation being at a cost which meant a 
lot (didn’t mean a lot) to the donor is to activate moral identity to be higher (lower) and moral 
identity would mediate the effect of costliness on subsequent donation behaviour.  
 We also sought to test the level to which an affective mindset moderated the effects of 
costliness and influenced subsequent altruistic behavior by manipulating participants to inspect 
their feelings towards the donation scenario, building on the work of Epstein and Pacini (1999), 
Strack and Deutsch (2004), Pham (1998) and Scharz and Clore (2007). We hypothesised that an 
affective focus influences choice so that a focus on the feelings associated with the initial 
donation increases the amount of a subsequent donation, regardless of whether the donation is 
costly or not.  
Finally, we sought to clarify how a cognitive mindset, being cast in literature as the other 
side of an affective mindset (Gardner, 1985) might compare to any moderating effects of affect 
in H4. We did this by manipulating participants to inspect their thinking towards the donation 
scenario in the same way we manipulated participant’s feelings.  
We conducted a power analysis using GPower (Faul & Erdfelder, 1992) with power 
 (1 - β) set at 0.80 and α = .05, one-tailed based on the effects found in the pre-test where 
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meaningfulness was the main driver of changes to moral identity (R2 = .228). This showed us 
that sample sizes should be N = 23 to have enough power to detect an effect of costliness on 
moral identity.  However, as Gneezy et al. (2012) had found a smaller effect between moral 
identity and subsequent donation behaviour (which we did not find in our pre-test), and we had 
included additional factors of cognition, affect and a control, we increased the sample size to be 
higher than identified in the power test for our first replication study to ensure we had an 
adequate sample size for the effects we hypothesised we would find.  
Three hundred and one participants were recruited through MTurk. The study was run 
between 15 and 18 April 2018. The sample included 155 males (51.5%) and 146 females 
(48.5%).  The age breakdown of participants was 4% aged 18–24, 36% aged 25–34, 31% aged 
35–44, 15% aged 45–54 and 14% aged over 55.  All participants were from the United States to 
limit variation of interpretation of the manipulations and any language barriers.  Participants 
were paid an amount for their participation which based on the principle of and average hourly 
rate in excess of than $US7.25, the US minimum wage (United States Department of Labor, 
Retrieved 15 January 2017). It was expected that the experiment would take about 8 minutes 
depending on the selected DV.  The average time taken was 3.08 minutes. Participants were paid 
$1.00 each. This effectively equates to an hourly rate of $19.48 USD. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (factor 1): costly and not 
costly, and one of four manipulations (factor 2): cognitive reflection, affective reflection, moral 
reflection, no reflection (control). 
Using the scenario from the pre-test, participants were asked to try to imagine they were 
in the following situation. ‘There is a charity display at your workplace where you normally sit 
for lunch. Spend a moment thinking about being in that place and listening to a charity 
presentation as if it is really happening. After listening to the presentation, you make a donation 
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to the charity which financially means a lot to you’ (costly), versus ‘… doesn’t mean a lot to you’ 
(costless).  As a manipulation check, both groups were asked to identify in US dollars how much 
might this be.  
Participants were then randomly assigned one of the conditions of factor 2.  In the 
cognitive and affective conditions, participants were given a sentence completion task which we 
had pre-tested to ensure effectiveness. Participants were told that we are interested in 
understanding the way people use words to describe experiences. Reflecting back to the donation 
scenario, please finish the following sentences.  
1. The donation would make me think/feel … 
2. The donation would make me wonder/my mood … 
3. I would describe my thoughts/emotions in such a situation as … 
The moral identity treatment was, as in our previous studies, the moral identity measure 
(Aquino et al., 2009; Aquino & Reed II, 2002; Gneezy et al., 2012; Reed et al., 2007). The 
control condition had no intervention.  
Following the treatment, participants were asked to give us feedback on a proposed 
introductory offer a well-known restaurant chain is looking at running for new online customers 
which gives them a chance to take up to 25% as a discount with the remainder of the 
25% donated to a local charity. What percentage would you take as a discount versus give as a 
donation? (must add up to 25%). This was the dependent variable. 
Subsequent to this, participants were asked some filler questions, an additional 
manipulation check question, demographic questions and then thanked for their time.  
Results 
In general, we were interested in comparisons between the costly and not costly 
conditions, donation behaviour and any mediating effect of moral identity.  In terms of perceived 
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costliness, the costly condition had a higher mean (M = 3.62, SD = 1.63) than those in the not 
costly condition (M = 2.26, SD = 1.01). A univariate analysis of variance of between subject 
factors found a significant effect F (1,300) = 75.461, p < .001. Those who made a donation 
‘which financially means a lot to you’ to the charity (costly condition) gave a higher amount and 
perceived the donation as costlier than those who made a donation to charity which financially 
didn’t mean a lot (not costly). This was confirmation that our manipulations of costliness were 
effective. 
Further, the dependent variable donation mean of those in the costly condition  
(M = 11.96, SD = 7.63) was higher than those in not costly condition (M = 10.04, SD = 6.76).  A 
univariate analysis of variance of between subject factors found the differences between 
conditions in the level of donation-making to be significant F (1,298) = 5.443, p = .020. This 
supports our first hypothesis that an initial donation’s costliness affects subsequent pro-social 
choice in that a costly (not-costly) donation increases (decreases) the tendency to give a 
subsequent donation (take a discount).   
Figure 15: Dependent variable mean scores of percentages given as a donation (out of 
25%) by treatment (costly vs not costly) including standard deviation. 
 
The main effect supports a view that pro-social behavior is more likely to lead to 
subsequent consistency when people perceive the cost to be of an amount that matters (H1). 
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However, what explains this relationship? What is the effect of the manipulation of costliness on 
moral identity? Further, what is the effect of moral identity and the other manipulated focuses of 
thinking and affect on subsequent behaviour? 
An analysis of the effects of costliness on moral identity (H2) found that participants in 
the costly group reported higher mean levels of moral identity (M = 5.09, SD = .99) than those in 
the costless group (M = 3.88,  
SD = 1.25). A univariate analysis of variance of between subject factors found the differences to 
be significant F (1,76) = 22.152, p < .001. This confirms our second hypothesis that the effect of 
the perception of cost to mean a lot (not mean a lot) is to activate moral identity to be higher 
(lower). 
Figure 16: MID mean scores by treatment (costly vs not costly) including standard 
deviation for moral identity treatment. 
 
In terms of differences in donation-making between costly and not costly for those 
focused only on their moral identity, a univariate analysis of variance found differences to be 
significant F (1,76) = 4.217 p = .044.  The costly group had the highest mean of donating (M = 
11.16, SD = 7.28) when compared to the not costly group (M = 8.01, SD = 6.16) 
z = 190.68, p = .044.  
We conducted regression analysis and 5,000 bootstrap resamples using the PROCESS 
macro Version 3 (Hayes, 2017) Model 4 to confirm the significance of the indirect pathway (i.e., 
5.09
3.88
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
MID
Costly
Costless
 119 
 
the path from costliness to donation through moral self-perception). At the bias-corrected 
confidence interval of 95% (-3.478, -.095) we found supporting evidence that moral identity 
mediated the effect of costliness on subsequent donation behaviour.  Figure 5 summarises 
relevant regression analysis between constructs.  
 
 
Experiment 3 indicated that a costly initial donation activated higher moral identity, 
which in turn resulted in higher subsequent donation making.  We concluded therefore, that 
moral identity mediated the relationship between costliness and donation behaviour.  
These findings indicate that the costliness of an initial pro-social action does activate 
moral identity as long as the psychological cost of giving is of a level which means something to 
the individual.  Further, it is this moral mindset which explains 23% (R2 = .2280) of the variance 
between the costly and not costly donation behaviour.  But what of the donation effect of the 
other focuses in this experiment? Is there a moderation effect of being in an affective or 
cognitive mindset? 
When comparing the effect of costliness on donation behaviour in the cognitive mindset 
group, a univariate analysis of variance of between subject factors found the differences were not 
X: Costliness 
M:  Moral identity 
Z: Subsequent Pro-Social Choice 
B = -1.22, SE = .259, p = <.001 
B = 1.48, SE = .666, p = .029 
  B = -1.34, SE = 1.70, p=.432 
  Indirect effect: B = -1.805, 95% CI = -3.478, -.095 
Figure 17: Mediation analysis, Experiment 3 
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significant F (1,79) = .373, p = .543. This was also the case in the affect mindset F (1,73) = 
1.411, p = .239 and the control group F (1,76) = .800, p = .374. 
Figure 18: Estimated marginal means of donation amount by costliness and mindset 
manipulation 
 
However, if mindset did not change the effect of costliness on donation behaviour, was 
there a direct effect of mindset on subsequent donation behaviour?  Those in the affect mindset 
manipulation donated the most (M = 12.75, SD = 7.42), followed by the cognitive manipulation 
(M = 11.39, SD = 7.20), the control (M = 10.41, SD = 7.33) and then those who were focused on 
moral identity (M = 9.53, SD = 6.87).  Analysis of donation behaviour in the moral identity, 
cognitive, affective and control treatments found donations differ in terms of the proportion 
taken as a donation versus a discount, F (3,295) = 2.77, p = .042 by manipulation. 
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Figure 19: Donation means by mindset manipulation 
 
To examine the interaction effects of the group and manipulations, regression analysis of 
between subject effects found that the difference between costly versus not costly did not differ 
significantly by manipulation of mindset F (3,291) = .29, p = .831.  
Table 8: Regression analysis of between subject interaction effects on donation behaviour 
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig Partial Eta 
Square 
Group (costly/not costly) 278.119 1 279.119 5.405 .021 .018 
Manipulation (MID, 
Cognitive, Affect, Control) 
417.404 3 139.135 2.704 .046 .027 
Costliness * Mindset 45.136 3 15.045 .292 .831 .003 
 
A more focused pairwise comparison found differences between the affect and control 
groups was z = -1.950, p = .051 and between affect and moral identity was 
z = -2.803, p = .005.  This confirms our third hypothesis that an affective focus influences choice 
so that a focus on the feelings associated with the initial donation increases the amount of a 
subsequent donation, regardless of whether the donation is costly or not, particularly when 
compared to the effect of a moral identity focus.  
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Discussion 
Our research to date has identified that when moral identity is activated, the effect of 
costliness on subsequent behaviour is mediated.  Donation amounts which mean a lot to the giver 
impress upon us a sense of morality in that we see ourselves as more helpful and less selfish.  We 
continue to behave that way when given another opportunity. This is the consistency effect we 
have sought to establish.  Donation amounts which don’t mean much to the giver, don’t send the 
same signal to our moral sense of self without the ongoing consistent donation effect.  
However, we have also established that a focus on how someone feels after an initial 
financial donation leads to higher levels of subsequent donation behaviour than a focus on moral 
identity. But what kind of affect matters? Do differences in the costliness of the initial donation 
generate differences in positive feelings about the donation amount? For example, does a 
donation which means a lot to you leave you feeling more positive about the donation?  And, 
does this matter? Would you donate more if you felt particularly positive about the donation?  
Experiment 4 focuses on this aspect of our pursuit of consistent moral behaviour after an initial 
moral action. 
 
 
